An Analysis of Internet Background Radiation within an African IPv4 netblock by Hendricks, Wadeegh
An Analysis of Internet Background
Radiation within an African IPv4
Netblock
Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Science
of Rhodes University
Wadeegh Hendricks
Grahamstown, South Africa
January 2019
Abstract
The use of passive network sensors has in the past proven to be quite effective in monitor-
ing and analysing the current state of traffic on a network. Internet traffic destined to a
routable, yet unused address block is often referred to as Internet Background Radiation
(IBR) and characterised as unsolicited. This unsolicited traffic is however quite valuable
to researchers in that it allows them to study the traffic patterns in a covert manner. IBR
is largely composed of network and port scanning traffic, backscatter packets from virus
and malware activity and to a lesser extent, misconfiguration of network devices. This
research answers the following two questions: (1) What is the current state of IBR within
the context of a South African IP address space and (2) Can any anomalies be detected
in the traffic, with specific reference to current global malware attacks such as Mirai and
similar.
Rhodes University operates five IPv4 passive network sensors, commonly known as net-
work telescopes, each monitoring its own /24 IP address block. The oldest of these
network telescopes has been collecting traffic for over a decade, with the newest being
established in 2011. This research focuses on the in-depth analysis of the traffic captured
by one telescope in the 155/8 range over a 12 month period, from January to December
2017. The traffic was analysed and classified according the protocol, TCP flag, source IP
address, destination port, packet count and payload size. Apart from the normal network
traffic graphs and tables, a geographic heatmap of source traffic was also created, based
on the source IP address. Spikes and noticeable variances in traffic patterns were further
investigated and evidence of Mirai like malware activity was observed. Network and port
scanning were found to comprise the largest amount of traffic, accounting for over 90%
of the total IBR. Various scanning techniques were identified, including low level passive
scanning and much higher level active scanning.
Keywords: Internet Background Radiation, Network Telescopes, Darknet, Network
Scanning
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Network telescopes are passive sensors which typically sit on the internet side of a firewall
and captures all traffic destined for a particular IP address range. The netblock is unused,
thereby making the traffic reaching it unsolicited. This unsolicited traffic is often referred
to as Internet Background Radiation (IBR). This IBR is essentially one-way traffic, con-
sisting of the connection attempts being made from the internet. No acknowledgements
or replies are sent. There are many sources for IBR, which ranges from IP address and
port scanning, denial of service attacks (Moore et al., 2004), internet worm and virus
activity, internet censorship (Dainotti et al., 2011) and potentially misconfiguration of
network devices. Irwin (2011) states that this traffic can be classified as hostile as it is
unsolicited and unwanted.
Pang et al. (2004) state that by monitoring unallocated IP address segments, as is the case
with network telescopes, is a much better way to measure IBR than by simply measuring
all unsuccessful connections. The latter would actually produce false data if there was a
host down at the time which was unable to respond to valid connections. Research done
by Zou et al. (2005), showed that IBR was very useful as an early warning system when
detection systems tested for certain anomalies in network traffic.
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1.1 Problem Statement
The Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis1 (CAIDA) runs one of the largest IPv4
network telescopes, which is located at the University of California in San Diego. It
monitors a full /8 IPv4 segment (224 addresses), which equates to 1
256
of all available
IPv4 addresses (Moore et al., 2004). The work done at CAIDA were some of the first to
use network telescopes as a tool to study internet traffic patterns. The research done at
CAIDA has provided valuable insight into the following areas:
• Network worm and virus activity
• Malicious network and port scanning
• Denial of service attacks
Over the past few years there has been a great increase in malware activity across the
internet, such as Conficker (Irwin and Nkhumeleni, 2015a), Mirai (Antonakakis et al.,
2017) and Code Red (Moore et al., 2002). These came in the form of viruses, self replicat-
ing worms and more recently, ransomware. Understanding how the malware replicates,
infects hosts and spreads itself is the first step towards stopping it. Security researchers in
particular, draw on this knowledge and understanding to assist in the development of se-
curity systems aimed at protecting networks. Information security encompasses so many
interesting areas of research, with network security being one of the most important. The
world has evolved to such a technological extent, that many devices and systems are in-
terconnected, sharing information across networks and over the internet. Understanding
the way internet traffic has evolved is an important part of learning how to optimise net-
works, developing safer and more efficient protocols and making the internet more secure
(Fomenkov et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2010).
Although there already exits a large body of research in the area of network telescopes
and internet background radiation, the majority of it has been done on IP address ranges
residing outside of South Africa. Little is actually known about the unsolicited traffic tar-
geting IP addresses in South Africa and Africa in general. The limited research available
for South African IP address spaces is largely due to the work done by Rhodes University,
where they operate five /24 IPv4 network telescopes. A detailed analysis of the captured
traffic from these telescopes have not been done since Irwin (2011); Nkhumeleni (2014),
with little known of how the traffic patterns have changed over the years. This research
therefore aims to investigate it through the objectives that follow.
1https://www.caida.org/projects/network telescope/
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1.2 Research Objectives and Goals
In order to get an better understanding of the makeup of unsolicited internet traffic
targeting South African IPv4 addresses, this research will focus on the following goals
and objectives.
Primary Objectives
• How has the Internet Background Radiation changed over the last 10 years when
compared with the analysis done by Irwin (2011); Yates (2014); Irwin and Nkhume-
leni (2015a) and others.
• Are there any significant anomalies that can be detected in the traffic, with specific
reference to recent global attacks such as the Mirai botnet2 (Antonakakis et al.,
2017) and EternalBlue3 (Nakashima and Timberg, 2017) based malware variants
such as WannaCry (Mohurle and Patil, 2017) and Petya (Richardson and North,
2017).
Secondary Objectives
• Analysis of IBR traffic according to protocol, port, source address, geolocation of
source traffic, etc.
• What conclusions can be derived from the analysis of the data.
• What observations can be made regarding the findings.
• What trends can be reported.
1.3 Scope of this Research
Rhodes University has been collecting IBR on five network telescopes for many years and
much research has been conducted on the data already. There have been comparative
analysis of traffic data across the five telescopes (Nkhumeleni, 2014), traffic analysis to
identify specific worms and malware activity (Irwin, 2012) and general traffic analysis and
taxonomy of traffic done (Barnett and Irwin, 2008; Cowie and Irwin, 2010).
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai (malware)
3A security vulnerability in Micosoft Server Message Block found within Microsoft Windows operating
systems
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This research will focus on an in depth analysis of traffic from a single /24 network
telescope in the 155/8 range, collected over the 12 month period of 2017 by the Computer
Science Department of Rhodes University. The network telescope is a passive sensor and
does not respond to any incoming packets, rather it logs the packet and then drops it. For
the 12 month period there were no interruptions in service or downtime due to hardware
or network issues, hence it was a full and complete data set.
1.4 Methodology
The methods to employ in order to successfully achieve the target objectives will be to
firstly become familiar with the data by viewing it in various tools and by gathering
statistics on the data. Understanding the data and its contents allows a researcher to get
a feel for the data, thereby having a better knowledge of how and what information to
extract from it. A sizeable portion of the analysis will be to identify and extract statistics
from the data in the form of “top 10” results. As the data set is quite large, grouping
similar events together and then computing statistics and drawing visualisations from it
would make it easier to view patterns and trends. Once a pattern or trend is identified,
the data will be analysed to a more granular level in order to fully understand the trends.
This research will have aspects of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The largest
portion of the research will focus on the quantitative aspects when measuring the statistics
and metrics from the data analysis, but it will stray a bit into qualitative methods when
interpreting some of the trends and patterns.
1.5 Document Structure
This document is divided into a sequence of chapters, each covering a different step of the
research, with each one supporting the contents of the previous chapter and continuing
on where the previous one left off. The layout of the document is as follows:
Chapter 1
This chapter introduces the subject matter, explains the objectives and goals of the re-
search and discusses the scope and methods employed in the research.
Chapter 2
A review of previous literature and research is covered in this chapter. The statistics from
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previous research that are relevant to this one are also highlighted and compared. The
relevant key concepts are explained and the chapter sets the tone for what will be done
in this research paper.
Chapter 3
This chapter focuses on the data and analysis methods. Firstly, it covers a detailed
account of the source and structure of the data. It then proceeds to discuss the various
methods available for the analysis of the data and which ones were eventually used. The
tools used in the analysis of the data are also covered. The initial results and overview of
the data is provided in this chapter as well.
Chapter 4
This chapter presents the results and findings of the research. It compares the results
with previous research that was done. Detailed statistics and metrics are provided in this
chapter too.
Chapter 5
This chapter further investigates interesting findings from the analysis and results of the
previous chapter. These findings are handled as individual case studies.
Chapter 6
This chapter is dedicated to comparing the findings of this research with that of previous
work. The main focus is towards previous research conducted on the Rhodes University
telescope data, but concludes with a brief comparison to other work as well.
Chapter 7
This chapter concludes the research and reflects on the objectives that were initially set.
It discusses whether the research questions were answered and looks at potential future
work in this field of study.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
This chapter takes a look at the previous research done in the field of network telescopes
and IBR. The methods used in the previous studies and the key concepts derived from it
will be applied to this research paper. This chapter also serves to explain the key concepts
and results that were obtained in previous studies and to give a more detailed description
of the subject matter.
Section 2.1 starts by introducing the key concepts of network telescopes, darknets, IBR
and the pioneering work done in this field of study. Some of the benefits of IBR analysis
are briefly mentioned and it also discusses a taxonomy used to distinguish between various
the types of network telescopes found. Section 2.2 continues by discussing the impact of
network telescope sizes on the probability of observing random packets on the internet.
The TCP/IP suite is discussed in great detail in Section 2.3, with reference to lower level
and application level protocols. This section contains three sub-sections which are used
to discuss the lower level protocols (TCP, UDP and ICMP) in more granularity. Section
2.4 takes a look at Internet Protocol (IP) and how it is currently implemented on the
internet. The differences between IPv4 and IPv6 are discussed. Current research being
done on IPv6 network telescopes are discussed in this section. Section 2.5 discusses SIP
traffic due to its high prevalence within IBR as well as its usage as a scanning and denial
of service vector. The last two, Sections 2.6 and 2.7, deals with the classification and
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analyses techniques used on IBR and the malicious network activity that is found in IBR
respectively. Section 2.7 examines network and port scanning, denial of service attacks
and worm, viruses and malware activity on the internet, each being discussed in its own
sub-section. Section 2.8 summarises and concludes the chapter.
2.1 Background on Network Telescopes and IBR
Using passive sensors to study IBR have in the past proven to be quite effective for many
researchers. Often many network security researchers are only concerned with malicious
activities aimed at actual systems or valid IP addresses. They tend to ignore traffic
specifically targeted at the unused network segments. Moreover, much of the network
analysis done after a targeted attack will show traffic patterns for that particular attack,
not necessarily the reconnaissance work done prior to the attack. Moore et al. (2004)
were some of the first researchers to actually study IBR, referring to it as “backscatter
analysis”. Their research focused primarily on understanding denial of service attacks.
Among the earlier work done on IBR are the analysis of source IP addresses (Barford
et al., 2006) and the general categorisation and classification of IBR (Pang et al., 2004;
Wustrow et al., 2010).
Irwin (2011) further expands the taxonomy of network telescopes by classifying them
according to the netblock being monitored. The classification scheme, as stated by Irwin
(2011), is:
• Blackholes, Darknets and Sinks - These are network segments that contain no
active hosts on them. All the IP addresses in the segment are not in use and any
traffic destined to it forms part of the data set.
• Dimnets - This refers to a network segment that has scattered active hosts in it.
The network segment is usually quite large and any traffic generated to and from
these active hosts are excluded from telescope data set.
• Greynets - These consist of multiple non-contiguous network segments which con-
tain active hosts in between them. Though quite similar to Dimnets, these differ
in that fact that they are made up of non-contiguous network segments and have
many more active hosts located between the network segments.
Antonakakis et al. (2017) observed in their study that their network telescope was able
to identify large scale Mirai botnet attacks. In the seven months of traffic that they
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analysed, they were able to identify over 116 billion Mirai connections coming from more
than 55 million unique source IP addresses. According to Antonakakis et al. (2017), when
the Mirai worm does a scan, it performs it in a very unique manner, leaving a type of
fingerprint. With the telescope, they were able to detect these fingerprints quite easily.
Irwin (2012) stated that distinct trends were observed which were related to the Conficker
worm. The researcher was able to identify the exact dates that the attacks took place
as well as identifying the different variants of the worm. Similar observations were made
by Jonker et al. (2017) with regards to telescope data vs distributed honeypot data when
it came to DDOS1. In the two years of data, as describes by Jonker et al. (2017), the
network telescopes received over 12 million attacks compared to about 5.5 million attacks
directed at the honeypots.
2.2 Network Telescope Size
Figure 2.1: The probability of observing a random packet from a particular host (Moore
et al., 2004)
Moore et al. (2004) and Pemberton et al. (2007) states that the accuracy of observing
large scale global internet events is dependant on the size of the telescope. The larger
the IP range, the more accurate the deductions would be. The probability of observing
traffic from a particular host is therefor greatly influenced by the size of the telescope.
Moore et al. (2004) shows the percentage probability versus time of observing traffic from
a specific host. In a full /8 network, the percentage probability is much higher than on
1Distributed Denial of Service
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a single /24 network and the time to wait for the packet is also greatly reduced. Moore
et al. (2004) states that according to their research, the probability of observing a random
packet on a /8 network within the first hour is 100%, whereas on a /24 network it would
drop down to around 0-1% for the same time period. The scaling between detection time
and the network segment size is not linear. Moore et al. (2004) further states that for a
random packet to be observed on a /24 telescope with the same confidence in detection
as that of a /8 telescope, it would take 65 664 times longer.
Although the size of a network telescope affects the probability of observing a random
packet, it has little impact on targeted scans or attacks. Smaller telescopes have however
still been useful in providing valuable insight into darknet traffic. Woodhead (2012)
analysed traffic from a small /24 IPv4 telescope over a 30 day period. The research showed
that despite there only being 256 IP addresses in the range, each unique destination IP
address received at least one packet within a 60 minute window. Chindipha et al. (2018)
did a study on the effectiveness of using smaller network telescopes to study IBR. The
study used two non-contiguous /24 IPv4 network telescope data sets, collected in February
2018. The collected data was divided into sample sizes based on destination IP addresses
and then further analysed. Each of the /24 netblocks were split into equal /25 netblocks,
who were then further split into equal /26 and then /27 netblocks (Fuller and Li, 2006),
as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Breakdown of /24 subnet into sample sizes (Chindipha et al., 2018)
The results showed that the count of unique source IP addresses targeting the various sam-
ples were fairly consistent throughout, with only minor variances observed. For example,
there was only a difference of 0.69% between the count of unique source IP addresses re-
ceived between the two /25 subnets. With the eight /27 subnets, the percentage count for
unique IP addresses for each of the subnets differed by less than 1%. The same similarities
were observed within both of the /24 data sets.
The benefit of using a larger network telescope is obvious, in that it allows for a greater
percentage of the internet monitored, but with the availability of usable IPv4 addresses
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become scarcer, it has become nearly impossible to obtain an unused /8 range for these
purposes.
2.3 TCP/IP Suite and Network Protocols
TCP/IP is a suite of protocols originally developed by DARPA2. It is essentially made
up of two protocols, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and IP (Internet Protocol)
(Forouzan and Fegan, 2002). The OSI3 Reference Model was developed by the Interna-
tional Standards Organisation to create a standardised architecture of the implementation
of networks and telecommunications (Wetteroth, 2002). The model consists of seven in-
dividual layers, each one controlling and taking responsibility for a different portion of
the communication. The seven layers of the OSI model, along with their functionality,
are summarised as follows.
• Physical - The first layer in the model, which deals with the physical media that
will carry the data or signal between the different points. It covers the physical
characteristics of the media (copper wire, fiber optic, wireless, etc), the bit rate
within the media, the different topologies of the media and the transmission that is
supported (speed and duplex).
• Data Link - The Data Link layer is responsible for the “organisation” of the data
stream into manageable frames, performs error detection on the frames, controls
the flow of the frames and is responsible for the transfer of frames between different
networks or systems by means of using hardware addressing.
• Network - Internet Protocol is found within this layer and it adds in the routing
and IP addressing information to create the packet.
• Transport - This layer is responsible for the delivery of the data between sender
and recipient. It performs error control through retransmission, flow and connection
control and is responsible for the reassembly of packets at the destination. TCP
and UDP can be found in this layer.
• Session - The Session layer provides extra services to the previous three layers in
maintaining and synchronising the connection between the sender and receiver.
2Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency - A military agency of the United States responsible
for defence research.
3Open Systems Interconnectivity - A conceptual networking framework used to characterise commu-
nication between IT systems
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• Presentation - This layer formats the exchanged information between the sender
and receiver. Often the two systems are not the same and the information needs to
be translated on either end. This layer also takes care of encryption and compression
of the packets. Protocols such as SSL, TLS and MPEG can be found in this layer.
• Application - The final layer in the OSI model, this layer makes the information
accessible to the end-user applications. The accessibility is provided through various
interfaces, using specific ports and protocols applicable to the applications.
Figure 2.3: OSI Reference Model compared to the TCP/IP Suite (Forouzan and Fegan,
2002)
A comparison between the OSI layers and TCP/IP layers can be seen in Figure 2.3. Al-
though TCP/IP was in development and operational before the OSI model was accepted,
it does exhibit many similarities in its designs. Figure 2.3 compares the OSI Reference
Model and TCP/IP suite. TCP/IP combines the top three layers of the OSI model (Ses-
sion, Presentation and Application) into a single “Application” layer. Within this layer,
all of the session, presentation and application protocols can be found.
Network protocols related to traffic can be loosely divided into two types, namely lower
level protocols and higher level protocols. Lower level protocols can be found within the
Network and Transport layers and higher level protocols can be found in the Session,
Presentation and Application levels. The levels referred to here are the levels within the
OSI Reference Model. There are many lower level protocols, but the most common ones
found in network telescope packets are TCP, UDP and ICMP (Forouzan and Fegan, 2002).
The higher level protocols are associated with the applications and ports used and they
rely on the lower level protocols for the way in which they are transported. Examples
of higher levels protocols and their ports are are HTTP (80/tcp), TLS (443/tcp), FTP
(21/tcp), SIP (5060/udp) and SMTP (25/tcp).
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Much of the network telescope research that has previously been done concerns itself
with a deep analysis of the protocols and ports in the traffic. The protocols and ports
being used provides an indication of the type of traffic arriving at the network telescope
and to some extent, the possible sources of the traffic. Research done by Antonakakis
et al. (2017) was able to track the traffic pattern flows of the Mirai botnet to get an
understanding of how it propagated and infected other devices. Their research analysed
the connections made on 23/tcp and 2323/tcp as an indication of Mirai activity.
Studies often compare the percentage of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic that makes up IBR.
Table 2.1 shows the findings of some of the previous research done on network telescope
data. As can be seen in the table, TCP is by far the most prevalent traffic type. It
surpasses both UDP and ICMP by quite a substantial amount.
Table 2.1: Results of previous research done using network telescope data
Research Paper Telescope Size
Research Findings
% TCP % UDP % ICMP
Irwin (2011) /24 81.57 12.62 5.89
Woodhead (2012) /24 97.9 1.4 0.7
Fachkha et al. (2012) /16 91.9 5.5 2.9
Czyz et al. (2013) /8 81.7 15.8 2.3
Fachkha and Debbabi (2016) /8 76.6 19.9 2.8
2.3.1 TCP
TCP is the most widely used transport layer protocol on the internet today and it has
many benefits over UDP. TCP is a stateful protocol, meaning that between the sender
and receiver a session needs to be established first. Only then can communication take
place. Once the session is established, the connection is maintained throughout the ses-
sion and once the communication is completed, the session is closed. Traditional TCP
communication uses a three step handshake method to establish the communication chan-
nel, as depicted in Figure 2.4. The source will send a SYN (synchronization) packet
to the destination, who will then in turn respond with a SYN-ACK (synchronization-
acknowledgement) packet. The source will then reply with an ACK (acknowledgement)
packet to complete the handshake (Postel et al., 1981b).
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Figure 2.4: TCP/IP 3 way handshake (Postel et al., 1981b)
Each TCP packet contains a header with various fields and settings. These settings are
used in the establishment of the communication session, maintaining the session and
eventually closing the session. Of the many fields found in the TCP header, only ten
of them are mandatory. Figure 2.5 depicts the TCP header, showing all the mandatory
fields. Three of the mandatory fields used in the analysis of network telescope traffic,
along with its description, are listed below:
Figure 2.5: TCP header showing all mandatory fields (Postel et al., 1981b)
• Source Port - The sender’s port used to initiate the connection or respond to one.
It is 16 bits in length and is often randomly generated.
• Destination Port - The field is 16 bits in length and is the port associated with
the service being connected to, i.e. when connecting to a web page, the server will
usually listen and accept connections on port 80 or 443.
• Flags - This field is also referred to as the Control Bits. It is six bits in length
and each bit can be either a “1” or a “0”, turning the control bit on or off. The
six control bits are URG (Urgent Pointer), ACK (Acknowledgement), PSH (Push
Function), RST (Connection Reset), SYN (Synchronize Sequence Numbers) and
FIN (Final Packet).
Due to its reliability, flow control, congestion control and error checking, TCP is the
preferred protocol for many types of data transmission and applications. Applications
such as FTP, SMTP, Telnet and SSH all uses TCP. It is therefore understandable that
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TCP generally makes up the majority of traffic on the internet.
2.3.2 UDP
UDP differs in comparison to TCP in that it is a stateless protocol and does not concern
itself with whether packets get delivered or not. There is no complicated establishment
of sessions or three way handshaking as with TCP (Forouzan and Fegan, 2002). UDP
packets or datagrams also has a header on every one, but it is much less complex than the
header of TCP. The header contains four fields, with only two of them being mandatory.
All fields are 16 bits in length. Figure 2.6 depicts the UDP header, with mandatory fields
marked in blue.
Figure 2.6: UDP header showing all fields
The list of UDP header fields, as outlined by the UDP RFC (Postel, 1980), are further
described below:
• Source Port - This field contains the randomly generated sender port.
• Destination Port - This is a mandatory field and the value is associated to the
application being connected to and listening port of the destination address.
• Length - This field is mandatory and contains the value in bytes of the header and
data.
• Checksum - This is an optional field which could be used for datagram error
checking.
Due to the fact that UDP does not have any error checking or congestion checking func-
tionality, packet loss is often experienced. For applications that do not require these
functionalities, but instead requires a lightweight option, this protocol is often used. Ex-
amples of applications that use UDP are multimedia streaming and voice over IP services.
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), which is widely used in voice over IP systems, can
be encapsulated in either TCP or UDP, but UDP is the preferred option in most systems.
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2.3.3 ICMP
Whereas TCP and UDP are transport layer protocols, ICMP is situated just below it in
the network layer and encapsulated within Internet Protocol. Due to the fact that IP lacks
certain functionality such as error detection and error correction, ICMP provides a type of
support role to IP (Forouzan and Fegan, 2002). ICMP datagrams are used to determine
the route to a destination host, check if gateways are operational and to determine the
shortest path to the destination host (Postel et al., 1981a). Like TCP and UDP, each
ICMP datagram has a header with required fields. Figure 2.7 depicts the ICMP header
with its fields.
Figure 2.7: ICMP header showing all fields (Postel et al., 1981a)
The main fields of the ICMP header are Type, Code and Checksum. The type field is eight
bits in length and sets the type of ICMP datagram being sent. There are many types of
ICMP datagrams, but they can be split into two basic groups, namely query messages
and error reporting messages (Forouzan and Fegan, 2002). Table 2.2 summarises the main
type fields and classifies them according to the groups.
Table 2.2: ICMP datagram types (Forouzan and Fegan, 2002)
Category Type Description
Error Reporting 3 Destination unreachable
Error Reporting 4 Source quench due to flow control
Error Reporting 11 Time to live has expired
Error Reporting 12 Issue with a parameter
Error Reporting 5 Message redirection
Query Message 0 Echo reply
Query Message 8 Echo request
Query Message 12 Timestamp reply
Query Message 13 Timestamp request
The code field is eight bits in length and works along with the type field to further identify
the datagram. As an example, when an ICMP datagram has type field “3” set, it can
have the code set to a number between zero and 15. When the code is “0”, the datagram
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indicates that the destination network is unreachable, but when the code is set to “3”, it
indicates that the destination port is unreachable. All 16 codes for type 3 have different
descriptions for the datagram. The checksum field is used for error checking and is 16
bits in length. The rest of the header field contains additional information and may vary
according to which type and code is set. This field is 32 bits in length.
There are many applications available that uses ICMP packets to test network connectivity
issues and response times to destination hosts. Ping4 (Packet Internet Gopher) is a very
common software utility, available as part of most operating systems, that can be used to
perform such tests. It is specifically used for message queries and not error reports. An
echo request, which has an ICMP type set to “8” is used in this way. The response would
be in the form of an acho reply, which has an ICMP type set to “0”. This is discussed
further in Section 2.6, which deals with active and passive traffic. A major portion of
ICMP traffic on the internet is generated by applications like this, as it is a quick and
easy way to check if a host is active or not.
2.4 Internet Protocols
IPv4 is still the most commonly used internet protocol today, but when IPv6 eventually
gets implemented globally, each networked device could potentially have its own unique
IP address. IPv6 uses 128bit addressing as opposed to IPv4 which uses 32bit, giving a
potential of 3.4 x 1034 usable addresses (Stallings, 1996). This means that network address
translation will no longer be required and that devices could potentially be connected to
one big “public” network, with the internet being the backbone of it. Table 2.3 below
summarises the key differences between IPv4 and IPv6 as it applies to this discussion.
Table 2.3: Comparison between IPv4 and IPv6
IPv4 IPv6
Address Space 4.29 x 109 3.4 x 1034
Address Length 32 bit 128 bit
Representation Dotted Quad Decimal Hexadecimal
Since IPv4 is the most widely used internet protocol at the moment, it is understandable
that most of the network telescope and internet background radiation research would
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ping (networking utility)
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focus their efforts in this area. There has however been a small amount of research done
on IPv6. In one of the first IBR studies done on IPv6, Ford et al. (2006) reported that
their research yielded very little data, stating that only 12 packets had been received by
the network telescope for the period that they were capturing. The capturing was done
on a small /48 network from December 2004 up to and including March 2006. Ford et al.
(2006) states that other similar research to this, but utilising a larger IPv6 address space,
yielded similar results to theirs. In research conducted by Irwin (2011), it is stated that
over an 18 month monitoring period of a /48 network, the only packets recorded were the
status probes sent to the network telescope.
In a later study done by Czyz et al. (2013), they performed a collection and analysis of
IPv6 IBR. The study was meant to build on the previous research done by Ford et al.
(2006). Their network telescope had a much greater address space than previous studies,
utilising five /12 IPv6 networks segments, which equates to a very large portion of the
total IPv6 addresses currently allocated to the internet. At the same time, they configured
an IPv4 telescope with a network range slightly smaller than a /8 network, to compare
the results against each other. Table 2.4 shows the comparison in low level protocol
breakdown between the observed IPv4 and IPv6 network telescope traffic.
Table 2.4: Comparison of traffic breakdown between IPv4 and IPv6 (Czyz et al., 2013)
Network Segments % TCP % UDP % ICMP % Other
IPv4 [/8] 81.7 15.8 2.3 0.2
IPv6 [5 x /12] 3.3 2.9 93.8 < 0.1
IPv6 is increasingly being adopted within academia and organisations, with provision
being made for the support of both IPv4 and IPv6, according to Li et al. (2014). They
also mention that Chinese researchers have developed a full IPv6 only backbone which is
currently being used for security testing and other research.
2.5 Session Initiation Protocol
SIP scans have become quite commonplace on the internet (Raftopoulos et al., 2015),
often accounting for the largest portion of UDP traffic (Fachkha et al., 2012; Irwin, 2012)
within IBR.
Session Initiation Protocol operates as a signalling protocol, used in the streaming of voice
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and video applications. It is responsible for the initiation, maintenance and termination of
the session. Voice over IP services typically uses SIP in their communications (Johnston,
2015). SIP uses a standard method of creating, maintaining and terminating the session.
Fachkha et al. (2012) noted that SIP has become one of the most prevalent applications
found within darknet traffic, with it currently being used for denial of service attacks
against voice of IP systems.
Figure 2.8: Establishment of a SIP session (Johnston, 2015)
SIP uses a text based encoding for its messages, which is readable within Wireshark.
Figure 2.8 shows a simple establishment of a SIP session. When the session is initiated
via the “INVITE”, certain header fields are set according to the requirements. As noted
by Rosenberg et al. (2002), the header begins with the word INVITE, which is the method
name. It then follows with a list of header fields, some of which are required and some of
which are optional. Below are a list of header fields which are required.
• Via - The header field contains the DNS or IP address to where the connection is be-
ing sent. A second parameter called ”branch” is used to identify the session. An ex-
ample would be “Via: SIP/2.0/UDP sipserver.ru.ac.za;branch=qkdyxi730smdtqlx”.
• To - The field contains a name to which the connection is being sent to. Along with
this is a URI5, which is usually in a format similar to an email address. An example
of this field is “To: John <sip:john@ru.ac.za>”.
• From - This field is very similar to the “To” field but instead of a “branch”
parameter, it has a “tag” parameter. An example of this field is “From: Sarah
<sip:sarah@uct.ac.za;tag=396265386638>”.
• Call-ID - This fields consists of a globally unique identifier consisting of a random
5Universal Resource Identifier
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string and the caller’s name or IP address. An example of this field is “Call-ID:
40133313839303@server99.labserver.ac.za”.
• CSeq - The Command Sequence field is made up of a random integer along with
the method name. An example of this is “CSeq: 284540296836 INVITE”.
• Contact - This field will contain a SIP URI and will contain either a fully qualified
domain name (FQDN) or an IP address. It is used to show the exact route in
which the destination server or person is to be reached. An example of this is
“<sip:jane@servername.domain.com>”.
• Content-Type - This field will contain a description of the message content.
• Content-Length - This field contains in bytes the size of the message body.
Unlike the previously discussed protocols (TCP, UDP and ICMP), SIP is an application
level protocol which is usually encapsulated by a lower level protocol. Although it can be
encapsulated in either TCP, UDP or SCTP, it is most often uses UDP. Wustrow et al.
(2010) observed in their research a high presence of SIP traffic on udp/15206. For a
full /8 network range monitored, SIP traffic accounted for 34% of the total packets and
nearly 50% of the total data. On further investigation, the SIP traffic was found to be a
maliciously crafted SIP invite request. Recent studies (Irwin, 2013) have shown that high
counts udp/5060 traffic, the port often used by SIP, have been recorded. Even SIP botnets
have been reported in a study by Dainotti et al. (2012). The botnet traffic, which ran for
approximately 12 days, was analysed and found to have 20 million SIP connections over
the period. These connections came from three million unique IP addresses. This botnet
was believed to have scanned the full IPv4 address space over the 12 days (Raftopoulos
et al., 2015). In the study conducted by Fachkha et al. (2012), they analysed a /16 IPv4
darknet data set captured over an eight month period. SIP (udp/5060) accounted for the
largest portion of UDP traffic and was also the top application layer protocol according
to packet count.
2.6 Traffic Analysis and Classification
The analysis of internet traffic plays a crucial role in understanding how the internet is
evolving and what applications are being used most often. This is important knowledge
to have when it comes to network design, network management and network security
(Caceres et al., 2000). While the use of network telescope data has proven to be useful in
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identifying worm (Irwin, 2012) and DDOS attacks (Moore et al., 2006), much research has
also focused on its use to assist in the identification and classification of internet traffic.
Wustrow et al. (2010) stated that the type of traffic, protocol and applications were easily
observable from their results.
The various SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK and RST flags that are set on the packets are very
important in understanding where the packets and connections originated from. Wustrow
et al. (2010) classifies SYN as scanning traffic, with SYN-ACK, ACK and RST being clas-
sified as reflected. With IBR being unidirectional network traffic, it should theoretically
only contain the initial SYN packet as there are no active hosts to reply with the SYN-
ACK response. According to the 3 way handshake of TCP/IP as illustrated in Figure 2.4,
if there are no outgoing SYN connections being made to the Internet from the network
telescope, there should be no incoming SYN-ACK or ACK packets observed within the
data. However, SYN packets are not the only ones that are found in IBR, as is evident
in Figure 2.9.
The SYN packet does however contain valuable information which is useful for researchers
to study and understand the patterns of traffic flow. Some of the information contained
in this traffic is as follows:
• Time and date stamp that the packet arrived
• Source IP Address of the sender
• Destination IP Address of the targeted node
• Lower Level Protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP)
• Higher Level Protocols (HTTP, SNMP, SIP)
• Source port, which is randomly generated at the time
• Destination port, which coincides with the service being requested (HTTP, SMTP,
SSH, HTTPS, etc)
• Other generic info including packet size, sequence number, TCP Flag, etc.
Figure 2.9 is an sample of a TCPDUMP6 packet capture from a network telescope. It
shows the one-way traffic without any reply packets.
The study by Irwin (2011) stated that IBR can be classified into either Active or Passive
6https://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump man.html
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Figure 2.9: Sample IBR using tcpdump (destination address blinded)
traffic. Active traffic is understood to be that traffic where a legitimate reply is expected
from the sender, whereas passive traffic is is that which the sender does not expect a
legitimate reply. Active traffic is associated with various network and port scanning
activities and passive traffic is associated with denial of service attacks where the source
address is spoofed. Ping floods are often carried out as passive attacks, where the sender
sends multiple echo requests from a spoofed source IP address.
2.7 Malicious Network Activity
Darknet traffic has effectively been used by researchers to identify and study malicious
network activity (Moore et al., 2003; Hick et al., 2009; Irwin, 2013; Antonakakis et al.,
2017).
2.7.1 Network and Port Scanning
The acts of network and port scanning are quite similar and only differs in the way
the actions are carried out. Both are a form of reconnaissance work, with the end goal
possibly being a malicious activity. Scanning can be the work of a human attacker who
is specifically targeting a host or network Raftopoulos et al. (2015), or it can be the work
of a self propagating virus or worm (Yegneswaran et al., 2003).
Network scanning that is done on a large scale can have quite a detrimental effect on a
network and its services Raftopoulos et al. (2015). An example of this is the case of the
Slammer worm7 in 2003. When a host became infected with slammer, it started scanning
random IP addresses across the network and the internet, looking for other vulnerable
machines. Within three minutes of the host being infected, it started scanning and was
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL Slammer
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able to scan over 55 million hosts per second, crippling the network that it was on (Moore
et al., 2003).
Port scanning is when the attacker probes an active host to see which ports are responding.
Scanning is carried out over TCP, UDP and ICMP echo requests (Durumeric et al., 2013).
Once a list of active ports or services are found, the attacker will try and use known
vulnerabilities associated with those services to compromise the host (Liu and Fukuda,
2014). One of the most common applications that can do port scanning is NMAP8. Port
scanning is often detectable in network logs by observing multiple connections to a single
host across a large range of ports and protocols. Figure 2.10 depicts a typical port scan.
Figure 2.10: Typical port scan of an active host
Network scanning on the other hand is generally performed in one of two manners. Firstly,
it can take the form of a general reconnaissance of active hosts. This could include
the pinging of a range of hosts on a particular network segment with the intention of
determining which hosts are active and which are not. ZMap9, a popular open source
network scanner, was used by Adrian et al. (2014) to scan the entire IPv4 address space
and completed it in under five minutes. The second method of doing network scanning
leans a bit towards port scanning. Here the attacker will attempt connections to a range of
hosts on a particular network segment on a specific, common network port. For instance,
the attacker could try and make HTTP connections to all the IP addresses on a particular
network segment in order to determine which of them are running web servers (Liu and
Fukuda, 2014).
Previous researchers (Yegneswaran et al., 2003; Barnett and Irwin, 2008) categorises net-
work scanning into four types, as discussed further below:
• Vertical Scan - This type of scan is performed on a single host, usually testing five
or more ports on that host over a single hour. This scan is usually performed from
a single source. The aim of this scan is to determine which vulnerabilities may be
present on the host.
8https://nmap.org/
9https://zmap.io/
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• Horizontal Scan - This type of scan is performed by a single host or source on
five or more targets in the same subnet. The attacker scans these hosts on the same
port, looking for the same vulnerability in them.
• Coordinated Scans - These are also referred to as distributed scans and are per-
formed by multiple hosts on multiple targets. This more aggressive type of scanning
targets a number of ports across the hosts on the network segment.
• Stealth Scans - As the name suggests, these scans are done is such a way to avoid
detection. The targets are scanned at a very low frequency and can be in the form
of either a vertical or horizontal scan.
2.7.2 Internet Worms, Viruses and Malware
Computer malware, whether it is a virus, worm, bot or the currently more popular ran-
somware, is basically malicious code intended to do harm to the system that it is executed
on. This harm is often in the form of disrupting the normal operations of the system,
damaging the operating system or data (encryption of data via ransomware) or the theft
of information. All of them work in similar ways, with worms and ransomware having
the ability to self replicate and self propagate across the network or internet to spread
and infect other systems. This type of malware will perform network and port scanning
to search for a particular vulnerability. Once a system containing the vulnerability has
been found, the machine will be attacked and infected.
As the malware scan for target hosts or spread across the internet, they leave a type
of fingerprint behind that is easily identifiable by security researchers and practitioners.
In mid 2001, Moore et al. (2002) were able to study the effects of the Code Red worm
from the data they captured on their passive network sensors. The passive sensors were
configured on unused network segments comprising of a /8 and two /16 networks. Code
Red exploited a buffer overflow flaw in Microsoft’s IIS10 server. This made it easy to track
as the connections were all coming on TCP port 80. Moore et al. (2002) were able to
detect 359’000 unique hosts who were all infected with Code Red and who were trying
to infect other machines. This information was extracted from a 24hr window within the
telescope data. Code Red used a specific algorithm to randomly generate IP addresses
which it used to scan for vulnerabilities. Figure 2.11 below shows the rate of infection of
Code Red.
10Internet Information Services - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet Information Services
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Figure 2.11: Code Red rate of infection (Moore et al., 2003)
Figure 2.12: Scanning rate of Slammer worm (Moore et al., 2003)
The Slammer or Sapphire worm began infecting vulnerable systems in January of 2003.
This worm exploited a vulnerability is Microsoft’s SQL Server. It spread at a much faster
rate than Code Red and at the time was the fastest self replicating and propagating
worm known. The worm eventually infected approximately 75 000 hosts, which is much
less than Code Red, but had a much greater effect on infected systems. When a machine
became infected, within three minutes it would start scanning for vulnerable targets at
a rate of 55 million scans per second Moore et al. (2003), as seen in Figure 2.12. This
caused a huge disruption of services across the internet.
Besides the malware that has previously been discussed, there has been a vast amount of
other research done in the area of malware characterisation and distribution, with some
of the most prominent studies in this field summarised in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Malware research using network telescope data
Malware Name Research and Year
Witty Worm Shannon and Moore (2004), Weaver et al. (2004)
Conficker Worm Hick et al. (2009), Wustrow et al. (2010), Irwin (2012), Irwin (2013)
Mirai Botnet Antonakakis et al. (2017), Liu and Fukuda (2018)
2.7.3 Distributed Denial of Service
A Denial of Service (DoS) is a type of cyber attack where the resources of a service gets
over utilised, thereby causing an interruption or degradation of the service to legitimate
users. In the case of a network DoS, this would take the form of a flood of network packets.
When the attack originates from more than one source, it is referred to as a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS). When the Slammer worm hit the internet in January of 2003, it
scanned for vulnerable hosts and spread at such an alarming rate that it caused a global
network DDoS. This included certain air flights, ATM’s and the American 911 emergency
services (Moore et al., 2003). According to Mirkovic and Reiher (2004), a DoS attack can
broadly be categorised into one of the following two:
• Vulnerability Attack - This type of attack generally exploits a known vulnerabil-
ity in an application or operating system and allows the attacker to use up all the
available computational resources (CPU, memory).
• Flooding Attack - This type of attack is related to the network and happens when
the attacker floods the network with packets, causing an overload of the bandwidth
and network resources.
Moore et al. (2006) produced some of the seminal work in the field of DDoS research using
network telescopes. They coined the term backscatter analysis, which will be discussed
below. Pang et al. (2004) further builds on the concept of backscatter analysis proposed
by Moore et al. (2006) and uses it in the analysis of their data.
With the continuous growth of the internet and internet related ecommerce, availability
of services is integral to the success of these online businesses. According to Orendorff
(2017), the global ecommerce sales market is currently worth about 2.8 trillion USD and
expected to grow to 4.5 trillion USD over the next three years. Because most internet
based web applications are open to the public and requires no authentication or validation
when a connection is made, it makes it very difficult to prevent DoS attacks. Also, there
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Figure 2.13: Backscatter Analysis
is no requirement in place that forces end users or server administrators to implement
the latest security patches on their machines, there by leaving them vulnerable to aid in
DoS attacks. Although DoS prevention systems have been implemented extensively across
the internet, it can be an administrative nightmare to manage and cause the denying of
legitimate traffic due to false positive results (Sachdeva et al., 2010).
As mentioned above, there are different methods of performing a DoS attack, but the
network flooding method is the most commonly used. When an attacker targets a specific
host or number of hosts, it is usually done through some compromised machine. In a
DDoS attack, the attacker will use numerous compromised machines to carry out the
actual attack. The attacks are performed using a single or a combination of TCP, UDP
or ICMP protocols (Sachdeva et al., 2010). The compromised machines would quite
often spoof the source address, making each packet appear to be coming from some other
third party. Essentially the attacker sends a SYN packet to the victim with a spoofed
source address. The victim responds with a SYN-ACK packet to the spoofed address.
When these SYN-ACK packets are detected on a network telescope, it is referred to
as backscatter (Moore et al., 2006). Figure 2.13 demonstrates how backscatter analysis
works.
Figure 2.14: Backscatter analysis graphs from three network telescopes (Pang et al., 2004)
Backscatter analysis has successfully been used by Moore et al. (2006) to identify the vic-
tim of the attack, the duration of the attack and some information regarding the method
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Figure 2.15: Sample of SYN-ACK packets viewed in Wireshark
of the attack. Pang et al. (2004) was able to graph the backscatter by measuring the
SYN-ACK and TCP RESET packets observed on their network telescope. Figure 2.14
shows the backscatter graphs taken from three of their network telescopes. Figure 2.15
shows a sample of SYN-ACK packets from a network telescope viewed in Wireshark.
2.8 Summary
This chapter took a look at the previous research in the field of IBR, with specific focus
on work that was applicable to this study. The chapter starts by providing background
and context to the use of network telescopes and what internet background radiation
is. It describes the the classification of different types of telescopes and how the size
of a telescope affects results. The chapter then continues with a detailed description of
the TCP/IP suite and the lower and higher level protocols associated with it, including
the analysis and classification of traffic. SIP is discussed in detail, as it is a major con-
tributor to IBR in many studies, including this research. Lastly, the chapter concludes
by discussing the malicious network traffic that is detectable within IBR. The malicious
traffic section covers port and network scanning, various types of malware activity and
distributed denial of service attacks.
27
CHAPTER 3
Dataset, Tools and Analysis Method
This chapter discusses the dataset, tools and analysis methods which were used in the
course of conducting this research. Section 3.1 starts by discussing the source and struc-
ture of the data, the data collection method used by the network telescope and lastly,
explains the reasons for using the particular dataset. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview
of the data and some basic results from the initial analysis performed. Section 3.3 covers
the tools used in the analysis and filtering of the data, the storage of the data and the
tools used for the presentation and visualisation of results. Although there were many
options available for the data analysis in this research, certain methods and tools were
preferred over others. Some factors that required consideration were the large size of
the dataset, the ease and speed of the data analysis, the time and costs associated with
certain methods or tools and the end visualisation and presentation of the information.
The methods and tools used by previous researchers dealing with network telescopes were
investigated and tested before the final decision was taken of which to use. Section 3.5
summarises the chapter and creates the platform for the Results and Discussion which
follows in Chapter 4.
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3.1 Dataset
Data quality is an important aspect of academic research and will directly impact the value
of the information produced in the results. It is therefor important to ensure that the
data is from a reliable source, captured and stored in the correct format and has not been
altered. The data for this research was collected using an internet facing passive network
sensor, also known as a network telescope. As previously discussed in Section 2.1 and
illustrated in Figure 3.1, IBR is essentially one-way traffic towards the network telescope
with no responses or replies sent. The network telescope captured the traffic from a /24
IPv4 network segment, which contained no active hosts or services. All incoming network
packets were stored in a packet capture (pcap) file, one for each month of the year. No
outages of the network telescope, internet link or capturing of the data were experienced
for the time period of the dataset, hence no data was lost.
Figure 3.1: Basic design for a network telescope setup
3.1.1 Source of the Dataset
The data for this research was provided by the Computer Science Department at Rhodes
University, where they have been collecting network telescope data for many years. The
internet services and IP address ranges are provided to Rhodes University by TENET1.
Within the IP address ranges assigned to Rhodes, they operate five network telescopes,
each monitoring its own contiguous /24 IPv4 subnet (256 addresses). Each of the five
/24 address subnets are however non-contiguous to each other. The IP ranges are all
internet routed and completely unused. Although these telescopes monitor a fairly small
address space in comparison to much larger ones such as the /8 (224 addresses) telescope
1TENET is the Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa. It provides internet
connectivity services to South African universities and research facilities. https://www.tenet.ac.za/
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run by CAIDA2, they still provide a significant insight into IBR within the context of a
South African IPv4 address space. The size of the network telescope, or the size of the IP
address range being monitored was previously discussed in Section 2.2. The first sensor
was established in August 2005, running on a 196/8 subnet. Four years later, a second
sensor was implemented, capturing traffic on a 146/8 address range. These were the main
Rhodes sources of data for the research done by Irwin (2011). In 2011, a further three
sensors were implemented, namely the 155/8 and two within the 196/8 address ranges.
Irwin (2013), Nkhumeleni (2014) and Irwin and Nkhumeleni (2015b) did a full correlation
and comparative analysis of data from these five network telescopes.
3.1.2 Collection of Data
The network telescope sensors at Rhodes University are located in the primary data
centre of the university and connected directly to the router located before the firewall,
per Figure 3.1. The sensors are essentially computer hardware running FreeBSD 11, with
various tcpdump3 scripts used to capture incoming packets and write their contents to a
file. These files are then moved to the internal campus network and stored on a redundant
NAS infrastructure for archiving and further analysis.
3.1.3 Selection of Dataset
The data from the 155-x/24 sensor was chosen for this research, as no significant analysis
work had been done on data from this sensor before. This network telescope was one of
the last three to be setup at Rhodes, with it being the only one in the 155/8 range. The
other two are in in the 196/8 ranges. The dataset was also one of the largest out of all
the sensors and was expected to produce some interesting findings.
3.2 Data Overview
The analysis of the data was performed in two phases, firstly at a macro level and later,
to get more depth and understanding of specific occurrences and events, at a micro level.
The full year’s data was firstly looked at to get a good overview of the traffic captured
2The Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis manages a large network telescope located at the
University of California San Diego
3The defacto standard across platforms for the capture of network traffic. https://www.tcpdump.org/
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in 2017. The analysis then moved on to a breakdown of monthly statistics, as compared
to the full year’s results. For the full duration of 2017, there was a total of 174 043 845
packets received, coming from 13 271 685 distinct IPv4 addresses and accounting for a
total of 12.96 GB of traffic. Table 3.1 shows the comparative statistics of traffic for each
month of 2017. January experienced the highest count for both packets and data in 2017,
with the lowest count for packets occurring in September and the lowest volume for data
occurring in June.
Figure 3.2: Traffic (pkts) and Data (MB) graphs for the year
Considering the total number of distinct source IP addresses recorded in 2017, the highest
occurrence of 18.93% was in January (2 512 778), with the lowest of 5.93% seen in July
(787 558). The graphs in Figure 3.2 show the differences in traffic patterns between packets
received and data received over the time period. There is a fair consistency between the
two graphs, with only few noticeable differences where total packet count versus total
data transferred were higher or lower for the same time slice. Again, this is typically due
to the TCP and UDP density in the data and how the protocols differ in their structure
and packet size. The highest packet count per day is recorded in early November, with
the lowest in early to mid August. On the contrary, the highest data count recorded for
a day was in mid April. The network telescope received the highest recorded packet and
data counts in January 2017, with the lowest recorded in June 2017. A more detailed
analysis of the packet and data differences is performed in Section 4.5.
Statistics regarding the packet and data flow for 2017 and each individual month can be
seen in Table 3.2. We see that the annual average data bit rate for incoming packets was
4Note that this is not the sum of the above rows as the IP’s may be duplicated due to it appearing in
multiple months
31
Table 3.1: Monthly comparison of traffic statistics for 2017 (155/8 sensor)
Month Packets % Packets Data (GB) % Data Unique Source IP’s
January 18 899 575 10.86 1.35 10.41 2 512 778
February 13 783 654 7.92 1.02 7.89 1 731 015
March 16 457 707 9.46 1.23 9.52 1 981 145
April 13 508 923 7.76 1.02 7.91 1 527 613
May 13 958 453 8.02 1.04 8.05 1 344 735
June 12 260 718 7.04 0.87 6.74 933 003
July 13 519 873 7.77 0.96 7.39 787 558
August 12 712 731 7.30 1.05 8.07 987 983
September 12 031 381 6.91 0.99 7.64 828 519
October 13 437 559 7.72 1.05 8.11 906 205
November 17 421 645 10.01 1.20 9.24 1 361 664
December 16 051 626 9.22 1.17 9.02 1 392 472
2017 Total 174 043 845 100 12.96 100 13 271 6854
3531 bits/sec, whilst the average packet size was 79.98 bytes and the average packet rate
was 5 packets/sec. When comparing the average packet rates to previous research, Bailey
et al. (2006) reports in their study that the sustained average packet rate for a /24 sensor
was 9 packets/sec over a 2.5 year period, with spikes reaching as high as 290 packets/sec.
The packet rate drastically increases when the network telescope size does. They reported
that the average packet rate for a /16 telescope was approximately 75 packets/sec and
a /8 increased to 5000 packets/sec. An interesting observation is that the top three
months for highest data bit rate is also the top three for average packet rate. These are
January, November and March respectively. However, the top three months experiencing
the highest average packet size are September, August and October respectively. This is
possibly due to the differences between TCP and UDP packets, which will be discussed
in more detail in Section 4.5. As previously stated in Section 2.3, an analysis of internet
traffic would usually include a comparison of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. Table 2.1
showed the comparison of these traffic types in previous research. The results of this
research showed very similar results, with TCP, UDP and ICMP accounting for 89.70%,
9.52% and 0.77% respectively.
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Table 3.2: Data and packet flow statistics by month
Data Bit Rate Average Packet Average Packet
(bits/sec) Size (bytes) Rate (pkts/sec)
January 4329 76.70 7
February 3632 79.69 5
March 3955 80.48 6
April 3396 81.47 5
May 3347 80.29 5
June 2895 76.52 4
July 3072 76.09 5
August 3357 88.41 4
September 3283 88.44 4
October 3373 84.05 5
November 3969 73.82 6
December 3749 78.21 5
2017 Average 3531 79.98 5
3.3 Tools and Analysis Methods
Many things needed to be considered before the tools and analysis methods were decided
on. Although many commercial network analysis tools were available, many of them were
quite expensive and a vast majority were geared towards analysing bidirectional network
traffic flow. Open-source and free tools were therefor preferred, as many of them also gave
the option of using customised scripts. After careful consideration, it was decided that
the best option was to load all data into a relational database and then use an analysis
or business intelligence tool to query the data. The methods and tools used are discussed
further in the next sections.
3.3.1 System Software and Hardware
The data set consisted of over 174 millions packets. This meant that the relational
database would also have over 174 million rows. This is a significant growth in data when
compared to the 23 million packets collected over a period of five years, in the study
conducted by Irwin (2011). The analysis or business intelligence tools would therefor
require substantial resources to query and analyse the database. A system with high level
hardware specifications was required that was able to support all the applications that
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were needed. A dual boot system was setup which ran Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise
64 bit and Kali Linux 64 bit. The dual boot option was preferred over running a virtual
machine as it allowed the operating system full access to all the resources available. The
system was powered by an Intel Core i5-8600K hexa-core processor and had 32 gigabytes of
memory. The data was stored on an internal Seagate four terabyte drive. Each operating
system booted off its own Samsung 250 gigabyte solid state drive. The Windows operating
system was used to run the relational database and BI tool, with the Linux operating
system used to run Wireshark, tshark, shell scripts and other Linux tools.
3.3.2 Libpcap
The dataset was obtained in the form of 12 libpcap5 files, one for each month of the year.
The first packet captured in the dataset was at 00:00:00.028 UTC+2 on January 1st 2017
and the last one captured was at 23:59:59.883 UTC+2 on December 31st 2017. Details
of the files can be seen in Table 3.3 and Appendix A.1.
Table 3.3: Statistics for libpcap data files
Month File Size # Packets First Packet Last Packet
(MB) Received Received
January 1670 18 899 575 01-01-17 00:00:00.0282 31-01-17 23:59:59.8847
February 1257 13 783 654 01-02-17 00:00:00.1025 28-02-17 23:59:59.9409
March 1514 16 457 707 01-03-17 00:00:00.2443 31-03-17 23:59:59.7586
April 1255 13 508 923 01-04-17 00:00:00.0701 30-04-17 23:59:59.8893
May 1281 13 958 453 01-05-17 00:00:00.4649 31-05-17 23:59:59.9977
June 1081 12 260 718 01-06-17 00:00:00.3969 30-06-17 23:59:59.8844
July 1187 13 519 873 01-07-17 00:00:00.1042 31-07-17 23:59:59.2358
August 1265 12 712 731 01-08-17 00:00:00.2172 31-08-17 23:59:59.7010
September 1198 12 031 381 01-09-17 00:00:00.4976 30-09-17 23:59:59.7768
October 1282 13 437 559 01-10-17 00:00:00.3514 31-10-17 23:59:59.9546
November 1492 17 421 645 01-11-17 00:00:00.1727 30-11-17 23:59:59.8005
December 1442 16 051 626 01-12-17 00:00:00.0413 31-12-17 23:59:59.8837
Libpcap files are binary and requires an application to interpret the packet capture.
Each libpcap file ranged between 1.1 GB and 1.7 GB. One of the most popular tools
5A Unix implementation of the packet capture library. http://http://www.tcpdump.org/
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for analysing network traffic is Wireshark6, which is available for Windows, Linux and
Mac. Due to the size of the libpcap files, it was impossible to directly use any graphical
tools to properly analyse any data, as this proved to be too resource intensive, partic-
ularly on RAM. The Wireshark package however provides many command line tools to
do the same tasks that the graphical tool does. These tools are commonly installed with
Wireshark. The command line tools used are listed below, along with a brief description
of their functionality:
• tshark - A powerful command line equivalent of Wireshark
• capinfos - Reads the libpcap file and displays statistics about the captured data
• mergecap - Used to merge two or more libpcap files into one
• rawshark - Analyses the raw libpcap data
Capinfos was used to extract traffic statistics for each libpcap file, including the data flow
rate, average packet size and the average packet rate. Mergecap was used to merge all
libpcap files into a singular file and then capinfos was used to extract the statistics for
the entire 2017.
It was important to firstly get an understanding of the data, its properties and all the
fields that had been captured. Wireshark was used to get an overall view of the data and
to do the initial searches. Wireshark also provides a very comprehensive graphical view
of each packet, thereby allowing one to do an in-depth analysis of an individual packet.
The various fields were closely studied to understand what information was required from
them.
The monthly libpcap files were individually exported to CSV7 files using a combination
of bash scripts and tshark, details of which can be seen in Appendix A below. When
extracting data with tshark, there are many options available for the format of the output
file, including JSON8 and CSV. As the intention was to eventually have all the data in a
relational database, the simplest option was to export to CSV format and then import the
CSV files into the database. Tshark allows the option of specifying the individual filter
fields that are required when exporting from libpcap format. Only certain data fields
were exported, as to not create too large a database with too many columns. The dataset
already contained over 174 million entries, meaning the database would have that same
amount of rows. Limiting the exported data to only the relevant fields would therefor
6An open source graphical network analyser. https://www.wireshark.org/
7A plain text file with each value separated by a comma
8A JavaScript Object Notation plan text file
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cut down on unused data, thereby making the analysis much quicker and easier. The
relevance of the various data fields were evaluated to see which impact they could have on
the analysis and how they contributed to achieving the objectives of this research. As an
example, each packet would have data fields that are not specifically required, such as the
ethernet source and ethernet destination addresses. These ethernet source and destination
addresses are essentially the hardware or MAC9 addresses, which has no relevance to the
research as each packet would have the same ones. That is because the ethernet source
address would be the router’s interface address and the ethernet destination address would
be the network card of the telescope’s address. There are many other “irrelevant” fields
that were excluded from the export similarly. Two sets of CSV files were created. The
first set contained the full complement of packets, all 174 million of them. The second
set of files only contained ICMP packets. The reason that the second set of CSV files
were created is because ICMP comprised the lowest volume of traffic, it had header fields
found in only ICMP packets (icmp.type and icmp.code) and did not contain certain header
fields that are found in TCP and UDP packets (tcp.srcport, tcp.dstport, udp.srcport and
udp.dstport). Having a smaller data set allowed for faster analysis of the ICMP traffic.
A list of all the relevant exported data fields and their descriptions can be seen in Table
3.4.
Table 3.4: Tshark filter fields and their corresponding descriptions
Tshark Field Description
frame.time epoch Time and date that the packet arrive in epoch format. Epoch is a unix format used
to display date and time. The timestamp refers the amount of seconds that have
passed since midnight of 1st January 1970
ip.src Source IP address
ip.dst Destination IP address
ip.proto Upper layer protocol
ip.geoip.src country Country of the source packet, based on geolocation data provided by MaxMind Lite,
which is supported by Wireshark and tshark
tcp.srcport TCP source port
tcp.dstport TCP destination port
upd.srcport UDP source port
upd.dstport UDP destination port
icmp.type ICMP Type field
icmp.code ICMP Code field
frame.len Size of the packet on the wire, including headers
tcp.flags TCP flag field of TCP packet
9The MAC (Media Access Control) address is a unique hardware identifier address
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(a) All packets (b) ICMP packets only
Figure 3.3: Database table structures in PostgreSQL
3.3.3 Storage and Data Query
As previously mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the libpcap files were binary, but in order to do
proper comparative graphical analysis of the data, it needed to be in a plain text format.
The analysis tool, which is discussed in the next section, supported a large variety of
data input methods, of which were various relational databases. PostgreSQL was used
because of its native support for IPv4 addresses as a data type field, its ability to run on
both Windows and Linux platforms and because it is open-source and free to use. The
CSV files were imported into a PostgreSQL10 database. pgAdmin 411 was used to do
all the initial SQL query development, view the data and to create specific queries and
views. Two tables were created in PostgreSQL, one which contained all the packets and
the second which contained only the ICMP packets. Initially it was decided to create a
single table to house all the data as there was no need to have a complicated structure
with multiple tables with joins and duplicated data. Later, a second table was created to
house all the ICMP packets. No joins were created between the tables and they operated
independently of each other. The structure of the database tables can be seen in Figure
3.3, with the epoch time as the primary keys. The SQL creation scripts can be seen in
Appendix A.1.
10An open source object-relational database. https://www.postgresql.org/
11pgAdmin is an open-source tool for the administration and development on PostgreSQL.
https://www.pgadmin.org/
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3.3.4 Analysis and Presentation of Results
Tableau Desktop12 10.5 was used to connect to the database and analyse the data. The
data was cleaned up and aliases assigned to specific values and fields in Tableau. The
epoch date was converted to a human readable date and time value using the following
SQL statement within the Tableau environment:
DATEADD(‘hour’,2,(Date("1/1/1970") + ([Time]/86400)))
Converting the epoch date to a proper date and time allowed for specific month, day,
hour and minute instances to be defined for the analyses of events. All data analysis and
visualisations were created with Tableau. Although Tableau is a commercial product, a 12
month full-access licence was available at the time of writing this, to registered students
and researchers. Tableau interprets the input data and separates the values into either
dimensions or measures. One is however able to interchange the values into measures and
dimensions as required. Figure 3.4 shows the values within Tableau.
(a) Data for all packets (b) Data for only ICMP packets
Figure 3.4: Tableau interpretation of the input data, showing dimensions and measures
12Tableau is a business intelligence tool used for the analysis and visualisation of data.
https://www.tableau.com
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3.3.5 Passive OS Fingerprinting
Passive operating system fingerprinting is a technique used to identify the operating sys-
tem that sent a packet. This is done by looking at certain TCP/IP field values of the
packet, which are unique to certain operating systems due to the way the TCP/IP stack
is implemented by them. Some of the fields that are used to identify the operating system
are the initial packet size, initial time to live (TTL) and the window size.
Two applications were used to perform the passive fingerprinting, namely P0f 13 and
NetworkMiner 14. P0f is an open source command line tool which reads in the libpcap
file and outputs the findings based on the analysis. It passively identifies the operating
systems based on a signature file provided with the software. It does not alter the pcap
file at all. When running P0f, it will output the results to standard output or it can be
sent to a text file for further viewing. P0f was run on Linux, as it is commonly installed
as standard along with Kali Linux. NetworkMiner is a graphical open source tool used in
network forensics. It can also nativelyz read pcap files and do an analysis on it. There is a
free version which has limited capabilities, with passive OS fingerprinting being included
in the free version. There is also a paid for professional version, which has much more
network forensics capabilities. The free version of NetworkMiner 2.3.2 was used in this
research. Figure 3.5 shows the typical output of p0f.
Figure 3.5: Typical p0f output
Both applications were used to analyse traffic suspected of being malware related, specif-
ically Mirai related. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
13http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f3/
14https://www.netresec.com/?page=NetworkMiner
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3.4 IP Address Geolocation
The global IP addresses are co-ordinated by and allocated by IANA15. They in turn assign
blocks to the various RIR’s (Regional Internet Registries), who assign the IP addresses
or blocks to ISP’s and organisations. There are five RIR’s that each manage a particular
region or regions as follows:
• ARIN - Canada, United States and certain Caribbean Islands
• LACNIC - Latin America and certain Caribbean Islands
• RIPE NCC - Europe, Middles East and Central Asia
• AFRINIC - Africa
• APNIC - Asia and Pacific
As IP addresses are allocated, the country and city that they are allocated to are recorded.
This makes it possible to track IP addresses to the country and regions where they origi-
nated from. There are many commercial software applications available that are able to
provide these details. Wireshark and tshark are able to use the databases provided by
Maxmind16. The free Lite version was used in this research, which allowed Wireshark and
tshark to associate each IP address with its corresponding source country. Maxmind also
produces a paid for version which is updated often and is much more accurate than the
Lite version.
15IANA is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority - https://www.iana.org
16MaxMind maintains a GeoLocation database, based on IP block information assigned to each country
- https://www.maxmind.com
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3.5 Summary
The chapter introduced the research project and provided the details of the data set. It
covered the source of the data set, the structure of the raw data and how the information
was extracted and analysed. It provided the an initial overview of the data, including the
size of the data set, the amount of packets contained in the data and the count of unique
IP addresses responsible for the traffic. A breakdown of the data per month is provided,
including the usage in gigabytes.
The chapter continued by describing the tools that were used to store, query and analyse
the data. Due to the size of the data set, it was important to consider the tools and
analysis methods used. There needed to be a balance between the functionality of the
tools used and the speed and accessibility of using it. The option of open source or free
tools were always preferred, although knowledge of its usage and functionality was quite
important as well. The data was loaded into a relational database once it was extracted
from the raw data files. Loading data into a database has the accessibility advantage in
that many applications are able to connect to it and access it. There is also the advantage
that a database is able to export data to various formats if required. Tableau was the
main tool used for both analysis and presentation of results. It is a really powerful tool
allowing for SQL type queries of data and has a vast array of predefined graphs, bars and
plots for the visualisation of results.
The analysis had a very repetitive approach in that when the first round of analysis found
interesting results, a deeper or further analysis then ensued. This allowed for varied levels
of interpretation of the findings. This was the very approach taken next. This chapter
provided a basis and platform for the further analysis, which was then carried out in
Chapters 4.
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CHAPTER 4
Results and Discussion
Chapter 4 presents the overall results of the analysis and research and continues the
discussion which was started in the previous chapter. Chapter 3 introduced some of the
basic results of the analysis and described the methods used. In this chapter, the analysis
methods are applied and the findings are discussed.
Section 4.1 discusses the statistics and metrics derived from the analysis. It covers a
detailed discussion of the protocols and ports used, a comparison of traffic patterns based
on TCP flags over time, a deeper analysis and geolocation plotting of the source IP
addresses responsible for the traffic and a comparison between traffic and data usage
patterns over time. Section 4.5 compares the traffic patterns of the packets and data per
month in 2017. Notable variances in the traffic patterns were then further analysed and
discussed. Section 4.2.1 performed an analysis on only the TCP traffic and categorised
it based on the TCP flag set on each packet. The next two sections analysed the IP
addresses in the traffic. Section 4.6 further analyses the reflected traffic and attempts
to identify the sources of the traffic. Section 4.7 looks at the source IP addresses and
Section 4.8 looks at the destination IP addresses. Lastly, the chapter is summarised and
concluded in Section 4.9.
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4.1 Introduction
The analysis commenced with a look at the traffic composition based on the main IP level
protocols. TCP accounted for the largest portion of both packets and data, with UDP in
at 2nd and ICMP in at 3rd. Figure 4.1 illustrates the traffic patterns for these protocols
for packet count and data usage. Table 4.1 shows that TCP accounted for 89.70% of
the total traffic in 2017, with UDP and ICMP accounting for 9.52% and 0.77% of the
overall traffic respectively. These three figures combined to make up 99.99% of the total
traffic. When comparing this to previous studies done (Pang et al., 2004; Irwin, 2011;
Yates, 2014), similar results were found, as depicted in Table 2.1. TCP always formed the
largest portion of traffic, with UDP and ICMP coming in at second and third respectively.
In a study conducted by Wustrow et al. (2010), similar results were observed. Their study
looked at five year’s worth of darknet traffic from 2006 to 2010. They noted a consistently
gradual increase in percentage of TCP packets over the years, except for 2008 where the
percentage of UDP packets was higher. They attributed this to the re-emergence of SQL
Slammer in 2008, which scanned internet hosts on udp/1434, causing very large UDP
traffic spikes Chindipha and Irwin (2017).
Figure 4.1: Packet and data graphs for TCP, UDP and ICMP
An analysis of the IP level protocols gives a directional indication as to what further
analysis needs to be done and where to look. As an example, Figure 4.1 shows that UDP
traffic is quite minuscule in comparison to TCP, however, the data graph for UDP is
surprising high. This is an indication that the UDP packets are much larger than the
TCP packets and warrants further investigation. As UDP is a stateless protocol and does
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Table 4.1: Comparison between TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic
All Packets TCP UDP ICMP
January 18 899 575 17 369 212 91.90 % 1 444 963 7.65 % 85 363 0.45 %
February 13 783 654 12 313 975 89.34 % 1 388 328 10.07 % 81 098 0.59 %
March 16 457 707 14 867 057 90.33 % 1 496 873 9.10 % 93 759 0.57 %
April 13 508 923 12 008 571 88.89 % 1 376 654 10.19 % 123 478 0.91 %
May 13 958 453 12 477 660 89.39 % 1 364 676 9.78 % 116 115 0.83 %
June 12 260 718 10 937 899 89.21 % 1 207 728 9.85 % 114 482 0.93 %
July 13 519 873 12 134 470 89.75 % 1 264 230 9.35 % 118 352 0.88 %
August 12 712 731 11 022 876 86.71 % 1 558 129 12.26 % 129 877 1.02 %
September 12 031 381 10 458 158 86.92 % 1 451 467 12.06 % 121 754 1.01 %
October 13 437 559 11 907 526 88.61 % 1 432 625 10.66 % 97 405 0.72 %
November 17 421 645 16 115 210 92.50 % 1 176 609 6.75 % 129 150 0.74 %
December 16 051 626 14 510 876 90.40 % 1 406 154 8.76 % 134 589 0.84 %
2017 Total 174 043 845 156 123 490 89.70 % 16 568 436 9.52 % 1 345 422 0.77 %
not require a complicated 3 way handshake to establish a connection, the initial UDP
packets can be sent along with a payload. Over the following sections, each of the above
mentioned protocols will be further analysed and discussed.
4.2 TCP
TCP packets accounted for the largest portion of traffic, accounting for nearly 90% of
the total traffic for 2017. A total of 156 123 490 packets were received through the year,
coming from 13 087 271 unique source IP addresses. January saw the highest volume of
both total traffic and TCP traffic, with the lowest experienced in September.
Table 4.2 further analyses the TCP traffic and shows the top 10 most prominent TCP
destination ports being targeted. The average packet size for traffic targeting the top 10
destination ports is 61.21 bytes. As previously discussed in Section 2.3.1, TCP requires a
3 way handshake before a connection is established. If no connection is made, no payload
can be seen in the traffic, hence the small size of the packets. Telnet, a client-server
protocol running on TCP port 23, makes up the largest portion of TCP traffic. It accounts
for 39.56% of TCP traffic and 35.48% of the total data for 2017. Telnet is commonly used
to remotely connect to servers, network devices and a large range of Smart IoT devices
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Table 4.2: Top 10 TCP destination ports
Rank Dest Port Common Usage # Packets % Packets Unique IP’s Data (MB) Avg Pkt Size (bytes)
1 23 Telnet 61 764 103 39.56 9 017 289 3 591 60.97
2 22 Secure Shell 10 123 059 6.48 1 347 710 599 62.03
3 1433 MS SQL Server 9 316 775 5.97 72 803 536 60.31
4 2323 Telnet 4 822 170 3.09 1 383 786 276 60.21
5 5358 WSD 4 342 646 2.78 852 774 249 60.00
6 7547 Router Exploit 3 385 454 2.17 1 361 100 194 60.02
7 3389 MS RDP 2 233 794 1.43 54 363 132 61.88
8 445 SMB 2 167 062 1.39 388 850 130 63.07
9 80 HTTP 1 991 465 1.28 117 377 117 62.15
10 3128 Web Proxy 1 747 084 1.12 1 884 101 61.48
Σ 101 893 612 65.27 14 596 052 5925 61.21
via a command line interface. Telnet is unencrypted, with all communication being sent
across the wire in plain text, including login usernames and passwords. As noted by Pa
et al. (2015), many IoT devices have been targeted by telnet botnet attacks over the
years. In 2012 the Carna botnet attack targeted more than 1.2 million IoT devices that
had either no username or password set, or had a simple default username and password
set. In 2017 the Mirai botnet also targeted IoT devices and broadband routers using
telnet running on tcp/23 and tcp/2323 (Antonakakis et al., 2017). Second from the top
is SSH (Secure Shell), which generally operates on tcp/22. Though very similar to telnet
in that it is used for command line communications to servers and network devices, SSH
implements symmetrical encryption for all its communication. It accounts for 6.48% of
TCP traffic and 5.81% of all data for 2017.
The remainder of the top 10 TCP ports are briefly discussed below:
• TCP 1433 - This port is typically used by Microsoft SQL Server instances and
the application listens for incoming connections on it. This a very common port
to search for on the internet as many vulnerabilities have been found in MS SQL
Server. According to CVE-Details (2018), there have been a total of 84 vulnerabil-
ities published via CVE since its inception.
• TCP 2323 - This is another common port for telnet servers to listen for connections
on. It was found that the Mirai botnet searched for this open port on IoT devices
(Antonakakis et al., 2017). This port is further discussed in Section 5.1.
• TCP 5358 - This port is used for Web Services for Devices. It advertises its services
offered via an HTTP connection on port 5358 and is often used by WSD printers
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(de Bruijne et al., 2017). This port was targeted by variants of Mirai due to its use
in IoT devices.
• TCP 7547 - This port is often used by networking and IoT devices for remote
access management. Mirai its derivatives were found to target this port on IoT
devices (Sutherland, 2016).
• TCP 3389 - This port is used by Microsoft RDP (Remote Desktop Port) for the
remote access administration of various Windows operating systems. It is often
targeted, as weak or compromised credentials will allow an attacker full access to
the system.
• TCP 445 - This port is used by SMB (Server Message Block) file sharing and has
been targeted by many trojans, worms and ransomware. The Conficker worm out-
break, which targeted this port, was covered in much detail by Irwin (2012). More
recently, the WannaCry ransomware attack used this port to connect to vulnerable
machines (Chen and Bridges, 2017).
• TCP 80 - Typically used by HTTP web pages, this port is often targeted by
attackers, looking for weaknesses in the web server or web page.
• TCP 3128 - Most commonly used as a port for web proxy servers, attackers would
look for badly configured or open proxy servers to compromise.
Table 4.3: Top 5 TCP source IP addresses based on packet count
Rank IP Address Reverse DNS Domain # Packets % Packets Data (MB) Country
1 94.102.49.7 towing.carsmemo.com 803 554 0.51 46 Netherlands
2 77.72.82.80 No reverse record 758 357 0.48 43 United Kingdom
3 163.172.135.224 < IP >.rev.cloud.scaleway.com 662 807 0.42 38 United Kingdom
4 74.125.206.197 wk-in-f197.1e100.net 591 265 0.37 39 United States
5 191.101.167.235 No reverse record 584 613 0.37 33 Netherlands
6 178.159.37.99 No reverse record 565 206 0.32 32 Russia
7 27.155.122.30 No reverse record 543 297 0.31 31 China
8 59.56.72.49 No reverse record 489 146 0.28 29 China
9 91.223.133.13 No reverse record 470 403 0.27 27 Ukraine
10 72.167.1.128 shr.prod.phx3.secureserver.net 469 028 0.27 27 United States
Σ 5 937 676 3.60 345
Pang et al. (2004) list the ten most targeted TCP ports, with five of the top ten ports
in this research also found in the top ten of their research. These ports are TCP 22, 23,
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80, 445 and 1433. In a study conducted by Vichaidis et al. (2018) on darknet traffic,
of their top nine TCP targeted ports, seven of them correspond to the results found in
this research. These ports are TCP 23, 22, 2323, 5358, 7547, 3389 and 445. Their top
two ports are also the top two ports in this research, namely tcp/23 and tcp/22. Irwin
(2013) analysed the traffic from the same /24 sensor that this study used. The data set
comprised a 15 month sample starting in February 2011 to May 2012. The listed top 10
TCP ports from that study contained six of the same listed ports in this study. Those
ports are TCP 445, 3389, 1433, 80, 22 and 23. Figure 4.3 shows the top 10 TCP source IP
addresses based on packet count. When compared to the overall top 10 IP addresses for
all traffic types in Figure 4.13, six of these IP addresses are found in both tables. Source
IP addresses are further discussed in Section 4.7.
4.2.1 TCP Flag
As previously discussed in Section 2.6 and described in Figure 2.4, TCP uses a three-way
handshake to establish a connection. During the connection and communications, certain
flags within the TCP header are set according to the whether it is a SYN, SYN-ACK,
ACK, RST, etc packet. As darkweb traffic is one-way communication only, TCP flags
will give an indication as to they type of traffic that is being received. Below is a brief
overview of the the four most prominent TCP flags found within this traffic:
• SYN - These packets are the first ones sent to initiate a TCP connection and with
darkweb traffic, would usually indicate network or port scanning activities as no
active hosts exist within the IP address space.
• ACK - These packets are sent as an acknowledgement to a SYN packet and as no
initial SYN packets are sent from the IP address range, these packets are a good
indicator of IP address spoofing that has occurred and the result of a DDoS. This
is referred to as backscatter.
• SYN-ACK - The SYN-ACK packet is the final step in the 3-way TCP handshake
and this establishes the connection. This traffic is also backscatter and an good
indicator of IP address spoofing due to a DDoS attack.
• RST - This is the packet that is sent in order to terminate a TCP connection. In
this instance, it forms part of backscatter traffic.
Figure C.4 depicts the traffic patterns for the four most prominent traffic types over time.
Table 4.4 further shows the statistics for these four traffic types. As can be seen from
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Table 4.4: Packet and data volume based on TCP flag
TCP Flag # Packets % Packets Data (MB)
SYN 142 286 942 81.75 8 252
ACK 249 336 0.14 78
SYN-ACK 12 178 682 6.99 724
RST 577 607 0.33 33
Σ 155 292 567 89.21 9087
Figure 4.2: The four most prominent traffic, based on TCP Flag
the table, SYN traffic makes up the largest portion of the four types and accounts for
81.75% of the total traffic for 2017. The remainder of the packets from ACK, SYN-ACK
and RST traffic combines to account for 7.46% of the total traffic for 2017. Pang et al.
(2004) classifies SYN traffic as purely scanning, as packets are sent with the expectation
of receiving a reply. This is also referred to as part of active traffic by Irwin (2011).
On the other hand, SYN-ACK, ACK and RST are classified as reflected or backscatter
traffic by Pang et al. (2004). Irwin (2011) does not specifically refer to SYN-ACK and
ACK packets as passive traffic, but RST is. A more detailed analysis of scanning traffic
is presented in Section 5.2, including a scrutiny of SYN traffic patterns as illustrated in
Figure C.4. The reflected traffic will be examined as a specific case study in Section 4.6.
4.3 UDP
As shown in Table 4.5, the dominant UDP traffic is on port 5060. It accounts for a total of
27.67% of all UDP traffic and 2.63% of the total traffic for 2017. As previously mentioned
in section 3.2, the total data for 2017 was 12.96 GB. Looking at Table 4.5, we see the total
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Table 4.5: Top 10 UDP destination ports
Rank Dest Port Common Usage # Packets % Packets Unique IP’s Data (MB) Avg Pkt Size (bytes)
1 5060 SIP 4 585 939 27.67 2 436 1 981 79.92
2 1900 UPnP 2 422 888 14.62 12 889 313 69.83
3 123 NTP 1 163 070 7.01 3 926 104 94.01
4 53 DNS 719 371 4.34 2 992 56 81.65
5 53413 Router Exploit 688 720 4.15 1 723 61 93.23
6 161 SNMP 473 875 2.86 2 522 43 94.44
7 137 NetBIOS 301 063 1.81 2 334 26 92.02
8 19 Testing/Debugging 248 689 1.50 898 15 61.38
9 111 Portmapper 218 359 1.31 241 17 82.19
10 1434 MS SQL Server 213 276 1.28 676 30 147.60
Σ 11 035 250 66.55 30 637 2 646 89.62
data for udp/5060 is about 1.9 GB. UDP/5060 is a port typically used for SIP traffic. It is
notable to mention that despite udp/5060 only accounting for 2.63% of the total packets,
it accounts for 21.06% of the total UDP data. Irwin (2013) notes that udp/5060 was the
top UDP port targeted in the findings of that study. In that research, the data from five
/24 network telescopes were analysed. Each telescope’s netblock was non-contiguous to
each other. All telescopes had udp/5060 as the top UDP port, with each accounting for
over 20% of the UDP traffic for the respective sensor. SIP is discussed at length as a case
study in Section 5.3.
The rest of the top 10 UDP ports are briefly discussed below:
• UDP 1900 - This port is used and has been registered by Microsoft for SSDP
(Simple Service Delivery Protocol). By default this port was open on Windows XP
and made it extremely vulnerable to remote attack (Majkowski, 2017). Bajpai et al.
(2018) states that many IoT devices use this port to advertise their services. They
further note that this port has been targeted to scan and map out IoT devices on a
network.
• UDP 123 - Used by the NTP (Network Time Protocol) for synchronisation of time
across a network or internet (Wilkins, 2012).
• UDP 53 - The standard port for DNS name resolution. DNS exploits are very pop-
ular, such as DNS poisoning which causes incorrect name server resolution (Shulman
and Waidner, 2014).
• UDP 53413 - Routers manufactured by Netcore have been found to have an ex-
ploitable backdoor running on this port (Yeh, 2014).
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• UDP 161 - This port is used by SNMP (Simple Network Monitoring Protocol),
which is used by many network devices and servers to send logging information to.
Insecure write access could lead to a fully compromised system (Wilkins, 2012).
• UDP 137 - Used by the NETBIOS protocol which is used for file and print sharing
on networks (Wilkins, 2012).
• UDP 19 - Used by CGP (Character Generator Protocol, also known as chargen),
which is used for debugging and testing. Services configured on this port accepts
a stream of characters it receives (Postel, 1983b). Chargen is deprecated, but still
often seen in reflected DDoS.
• UDP 11 - This port is often used by a legacy Unix service used to dump active
process information to, which is no longer used due to the inherent security risks
associated with its implementation (Postel, 1983a).
• UDP 1434 - This port is used for MS SQL Server management. Badly configured
servers have had the application compromised through this port. An example of an
attack which targeted this port is the SQL Slammer worm (Moore et al., 2003).
Table 4.6: Top 10 UDP source IP addresses based on packet count
Rank IP Address Reverse DNS Domain # Packets % Packets Data (MB) Country
1 163.172.215.161 < IP >.rev.poneytelecom.eu 508 588 3.04 220 Netherlands
2 185.94.111.1 No reverse record 487 667 2.91 36 Russian
3 92.42.107.139 No reverse record 190 005 1.13 81 Switzerland
4 146.0.243.29 No reverse record 142 336 0.85 61 Germany
5 62.210.36.129 < IP >.rev.poneytelecom.eu 120 057 0.71 52 France
6 92.42.108.203 No reverse record 106 960 0.64 46 Switzerland
7 184.105.139.67 scan-01.shadowserver.org 89 149 0.54 11 United States
8 51.15.209.185 No reverse record 88 320 0.53 38 France
9 104.171.172.6 rev.cloud.scaleway.com 84 562 0.51 7 United States
10 209.126.136.2 No reverse record 83 817 0.50 9 United States
Σ 1 901 461 11.47 561
Figure 4.6 depicts the top 10 source IP addresses based on UDP packet count. The
packets from IP addresses ranked 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th were found to only contain SIP
traffic. These are listed in Table 5.5 as the top four IP addresses for SIP traffic in Section
5.3, which deals with specific case studies that were found. The 2nd ranked IP address
communicated on UDP ports 17, 19, 53, 111, 123, 137, 161, 520 and 1900. The packet
distribution across these ports were fairly consistent throughout the entire year. The
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reverse DNS record for the 7th ranked IP address resolved to scan-01.shadowserver.org.
The Shadowserver Foundation1 is an organisation that does scanning and intelligence
gathering of the internet as a way to help prevent cyber crime. This IP address sent
packets on udp/161 and udp/53, which are the ports used for SNMP and DNS respectively.
Source IP addresses are discussed further in Section 4.7.
4.4 ICMP
ICMP traffic constitutes the smallest portion of the low levels protocols. A total of 1
345 422 ICMP packets were received for the duration of 2017, which accounted for only
0.77% of 2017’s total traffic. Table 4.7 shows the distribution of ICMP packets according
to their type and code. The largest portion of packets are Echo Requests, which is a total
of 1 051 536 packets and making up 78.15% of the ICMP total . Echo requests are sent
to test if a host is up and responsive and this is typically done using an application such
as ping, as mentioned previously in Section 2.3.3.
Table 4.7: Composition of all ICMP traffic, categorised by ICMP type and code
ICMP Type ICMP Code # Packets % of Total
0 - Echo Reply 0 71 708 5.32
5 1 < 1
15 2 < 1
3 - Destination Unreachable 0 - Net Unreachable 2 961 < 1
1 - Host Unreachable 1 958 < 1
2 - Protocol Unreachable 19 027 1.41
3 - Port Unreachable 136 812 19.16
4 - Fragmentation Needed 753 < 1
9 - Net Administratively Prohibited 2 < 1
10 - Host Administratively Prohibited 19 990 1.48
13 - Comms Administratively Prohibited 392 < 1
4 - Source Quench 0 deprecated 15 < 1
5 - Redirect 1 - Redirect for Host 155 < 1
8 - Echo 0 - Echo Request 1 051 536 78.15
9 - deprecated 183 < 1
11 - Time Exceeded 0 - TTL Expired in Transit 36 458 2.70
1 - Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded 4 < 1
12 - Parameter Problem 0 - Pointer Indicates Error 7 < 1
13 - Timestamp 0 - Timestamp 3 454 < 1
17 - Address Mask Request 0 - deprecated 1 < 1
69 - Unassigned 0 - Unassigned 3 < 1
1https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/
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As can be seen in Table 4.7, the only significant packet count other than the Echo Requests
(Type 8) are the Destination Port Unreachable (Type 3) and Echo Reply (Type 0). These
account for 19.16% (136 812 packets) and 5.32% (71 708 packets) of the total ICMP
packets respectively. There were 81 154 unique IP addresses responsible for the ICMP
traffic. Table 4.8 shows the top 10 ICMP source IP addresses based on packet count.
Table 4.8: Top 10 ICMP source IP addresses
Rank IP Address Reverse DNS Domain # Packets % Packets Country
1 46.234.125.89 prague-ping-1.cdn77.com 107 991 8.02 Czech Republic
2 185.94.111.1 No reverse record 53 439 3.97 Russia
3 146.64.28.14 dolphin.meraka.csir.co.za 38 607 2.86 South Africa
4 46.166.148.176 No reverse record 17 338 1.28 Netherlands
5 117.131.215.170 No reverse record 14 740 1.09 China
6 207.226.141.42 < IP >.static.pccwglobal.net 14 188 10.5 United States
7 111.161.35.146 dns146.online.tj.cn 13 748 1.02 China
8 42.81.86.90 No reverse record 13 480 1.00 China
9 107.161.88.35 No reverse record 12 808 0.95 United States
10 222.34.18.27 No reverse record 12 390 0.92 China
Σ 298 729 22.00
A further analysis of these top five IP addresses indicated that the addresses ranked 1st,
2nd, 3rd and 5th, only sent echo request packets. All these IP addresses sent packets to
all 256 IP addresses in the telescope’s range. The address ranked 4th only sent echo reply
packets, but once again also to all IP addresses in the telescope’s range. As the network
telescope is a passive sensor and would not have sent the initial echo request, this means
that the IP address range of the network telescope is most likely being used as spoofed
addresses. All the IP addresses listed in Table 4.8, other than the ones ranked 2nd and
4th, only sent ICMP packets. The 2nd ranked source IP address also sent packets to 15
different TCP and UDP ports. The 4th ranked IP sent 38 packets to tcp/22 and only a
single packet each to 2053 various other TCP ports.
4.5 Monthly Traffic vs. Data
The network telescope received over 174 million packets in 2017, with the total data count
in at just under 13GB. The number of packets and amount of data received by the network
telescope for each month of 2017 were previously illustrated in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
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Table 4.9: Top 10 packet sizes based on packet count
Rank Packet Size (bytes) # Packets % of Total
1 60 138 941 161 79.83
2 62 8 398 469 4.82
3 74 7 021 604 4.03
4 66 3 846 185 2.20
5 70 379 842 < 1
6 71 308 268 < 1
7 578 148 679 < 1
8 566 130 913 < 1
9 72 119 098 < 1
10 106 68 460 < 1
The sizes of all the received packets were not uniform and ranged between 60 and 1514
bytes, the same as reported by Balkanli et al. (2014) in their research on a CAIDA data
set. All packets (TCP, UDP and ICMP) reported packet sizes in that range. Table 4.9
shows the distribution of packets according to top the 10 most common packet sizes in
this data set. As can be noted from the table, nearly 80% of the packets were 60 bytes in
size and over 90% of the total packets were found to be between 60 and 74 bytes in size.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 displays the monthly traffic patterns for data (measured in megabytes)
and number of packets over time. The traffic patterns for the data and packets display
quite similar trends overall. There are however a few notable exceptions where the data or
packet traffic graphs at particular points are very different to each other. At these points
it is noted that one of the two spikes while the other dips. Some of these are highlighted
as “A”, “B” and “C” in Figure 4.3 and as “D” and “E” in Figure 4.4. These annotated
exceptions are analysed next.
A
This occurred on 17 January 2017, where a total of 620 150 packets were received on that
day, accounting for a total of 59.26 MB (62 135 948 bytes) of traffic. The point annotated
in Figure 4.3 shows a distinct increase in data over packet count. Taking into account the
number of packets and total data, if all packets were equal in size, the each packet size
would be 100.19 bytes. However, the data showed that there was a total 484 237 packets
that were 60 bytes in size, accounting for 78.08% of the data for that day. There was also
68 056 packets that are above 100 bytes in size, caused mainly by a large amount of SIP
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and SSDP2 traffic detected on that day. The sizes of these packets ranged in sizes from
103 bytes to 930 bytes, which accounted for the spike in data on that day.
Figure 4.3: Daily packet and data graphs for January to June
2Simple Service Discovery Protocol - Used to discover Universal Plug and Play devices on a network
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple Service Discovery Protocol
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Figure 4.4: Daily packet and data graphs for July to December
B
On the 2nd and 4th March 2017, there are distinct patterns in the graphs where the data
and packets moved in the opposite direction to each other. On these two days, traffic
spiked and data dipped. When looking at the data for the individual days, there was a
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total of 588 686 packets received on the 2nd, accounting for a total of 42 292 029 bytes.
For the traffic received on this day, 93% of it comprised of TCP packets. This TCP traffic
was found to consist of mostly scanning or SYN packets, accounting for 95.01% of it. The
packet sizes ranged between 60 and 78 bytes only, with an overwhelming 92.02% of the
packets being 60 bytes in size. Very similar traffic patterns can be seen on the graph for
the 4th March. A closer inspection of the traffic showed a resemblance in traffic make up
between the 2nd and 4th. This high count of small packets is what caused the differences
in the packet and data graphs. For both days, the major contributor to the traffic was
tcp/23 and to a lesser amount tcp/2323, which is a possible indicator of Mirai like activity.
C
This exception is similar to what was seen in “A”, where the data graph spiked much
higher than the traffic graph. This spike occurred on the 14th April and was coincidentally
the highest recorded data for a single day throughout the entire 2017 period. A total of
76 510 453 bytes of traffic were received on this day, coming from 536 396 packets. There
was a big increase in SIP (udp/5060) traffic on this day. These packets contributed to
61.41% of the total data for the day, coming from only 19.14% of the total packets.
D
A total of 401 988 packets were received on the 2nd September 2017, making up 54 770
715 bytes of traffic. TCP comprised the largest portion of packet count with 296 787
packets. It did however only account for 18 283 457 bytes of traffic. SIP (udp/5060)
accounted for the second highest count of packets with 71 898 in total. Although this was
only accounted for 17.88% of the total packets for the day, it was responsible for 32 320
947 bytes of traffic, which is 50.01% of the total data for the day. The spike in the data
graph was therefor largely caused by this udp/5060 traffic.
E
This exception occurred on the 8th October 2017, where a total of of 335 182 packets were
received. The largest portion of the traffic comprised of TCP, accounting for 80.02% of
the total packets on that day. SIP was the second highest, contributing 10.49% towards
the total packets. Despite the big difference in packet count between TCP and SIP, they
both contributed a very similar amount to the overall data on this day. TCP packets
added up to 16 599 448 bytes of traffic and SIP to 16 136 707 bytes of traffic. The SIP
traffic was not only on udp/5060, but detected across 37 different ports. Most of the ports
had exactly 256 packets to it, indicating that this traffic was some form of SIP scanning.
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4.6 Backscatter
Backscatter traffic is essentially reflected packets and when found on a network telescope,
is usually a sign of a DDoS happening somewhere. Reflected TCP packets can be identi-
fied when the TCP flags are set to either ACK, SYN-ACK or RST. UDP, being a stateless
protocol, does not have flags that are set during a communication session. It is nearly
impossible to determine if UDP traffic is backscatter without doing a deep protocol in-
spection of the packets. The fact that “response” packets are received in darknet traffic
is a clear indication that IP address spoofing has occurred. When attackers perform a
denial of service attack on a victim, the IP address of the source packets are spoofed and
the victim sees it coming from from other third party address. In the case of this data,
the attacker received packets with a spoofed source IP address belonging in the darknet
range. The various TCP flags provides an insight into the type of traffic that was used
in the DDoS attack. As noted by Moore et al. (2006), specific flags set in TCP responses
are linked to specific TCP requests. The most common responses are listed below.
• Attacker sends a SYN packet to a port that is open – Victim responds with a
SYN-ACK packet
• Attacker sends a SYN packet to a port which is closed – Victim responds with a
RST packet
• Attacker sends an ACK packet with no previous SYN or SYN-ACK having being
sent – Victim responds with a RST packet
• Attacker sends a RST packet – No response is sent by victim
Figure 4.5 illustrates the comparative traffic patterns of ACK, RST and SYN-ACK packets
over time, using the same axis scale. Having the graphs depicted on a standard scale makes
it quite easy to compare the traffic to each other, but causes a severe loss in detail for the
traffic with lower packet count. Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 therefore shows the individual
traffic patterns for each of the traffic types, with each having an individual axis scale,
thereby providing a greater detail.
Backscatter makes up a very small portion of the total traffic for 2017, with a combined
total of only 13 005 625 packets, accounting for only 7.47% of the total traffic. From the
total backscatter traffic, SYN-ACK makes up the largest portion with 12 178 682 packets.
ACK and RST comprises the remainder with 249 336 and 577 607 packets respectively.
Table 4.10 shows the packets count per month for all the backscatter traffic. The highest
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levels for each traffic type is marked in blue and the lowest is marked in red.
Table 4.10: Packet count per month for all backscatter traffic
Month ACK % of Total RST % of Total SYN-ACK % of Total
January 52 932 21.22 101 760 17.61 1 271 134 10.43
February 28 591 11.46 68 554 11.86 1 033 553 8.48
March 29 294 11.74 49 493 8.56 1 473 470 12.09
April 26 849 10.76 23 284 4.03 515 405 4.23
May 27 525 11.03 27 388 4.74 440 889 3.62
June 22 789 9.13 72 074 12.47 401 463 3.29
July 18 432 7.39 24 834 4.29 2 096 071 17.21
August 8 964 3.59 30 638 5.30 716 161 5.88
September 11 109 4.45 32 564 5.63 712 085 5.84
October 13 200 5.29 29 342 5.07 484 853 3.98
November 4 978 1.99 30 506 5.28 1 808 688 14.85
December 4 637 1.85 87 170 15.09 1 224 910 10.05
For the duration of 2017 the highest packet count for ACK traffic occurred in January, with
the lowest count occurring in December. RST traffic had the highest count in January as
well, with the lowest count recorded in April. With SYN-ACK traffic, the highest packet
count occurred in July, with the lowest recorded in June.
Figure 4.5: ACK, RST and SYN-ACK traffic patterns over time
The individual traffic types, along with their respective peaks are discussed further below.
The ACK traffic makes up the smallest portion of the total backscatter. In Figure 4.6
we see that there is a general downwards trend in average traffic from the beginning of
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Figure 4.6: ACK traffic pattern over time
the year until the end. There are five noticeable peaks occurring in the traffic on 23
March, 16 April, 22 May, 20 June and 28 July. The peak on 22nd May is the largest
of the five peaks. For the traffic on that day, there was one particular IP address that
accounted for the majority of traffic on that day. 4571 Packets were received from IP
address 210.48.154.99, accounting for 88.92% of the total ACK traffic for that day. There
was a total of 256 destination IP addresses associated with these packets, which means
that the full range of IP addresses in the network telescope was spoofed. The IP address
resolves to quid.centralmalaysia.com, a web hosting company in Malaysia. All traffic
received from this IP address had a source port of 80, which means that this was most
likely a denial of service type of attack on their website or one hosted by them.
Figure 4.7: RST traffic pattern over time
Figure 4.7 looks at the traffic patterns for all RST traffic for the year. There are five large
peaks that can be seen on the graph, with the first one being the biggest. The highest
three peaks in traffic occurred on 8 January, 16 February and 15 June. When further
analysing the highest traffic peak, there was a total of 73 851 packets received from a
single IP address on that day, accounting for 99.25% of the day’s traffic. All traffic had a
single destination IP address and source port. The destination IP address was A.B.C.100
(Only the actual last octet is shown in order to keep the network telescope IP range
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private) and the destination port was 15004. The source IP address of 137.74.206.93 is
located in France and has a reverse DNS entry of ns3057763.ip-137-74-206.eu. According
to the WhoIs3 record, the company who is associated to this IP address is ovh.com, a
web and cloud hosting organisation in Europe. According to Paganini (2016), they were
previously hit by a DDoS attack in September of 2016. This attack saw more than 1Tbps
of traffic, the largest attack in recorded history, hitting their servers.
Figure 4.8: SYN-ACK traffic pattern over time
The largest of all the backscatter traffic was the SYN-ACK traffic. Figure 4.8 shows a
constant average traffic flow, with many noticeable spikes observed throughout the year.
The three largest spikes occurred on 25 March, 2 July and 1 November, with the July
spike being the highest. When further analysing the traffic spike in July, it was found
that the top two IP addresses accounted for 51.90% of the total traffic for the day. The
following three in the list of the top five IP addresses make up 38.88% of the total traffic.
Table 4.11 shows the details of the top five IP addresses for the day. Both IP addresses
were located in the United States and all traffic from these IP addresses had a source port
of tcp/80.
Table 4.11: Statistics of top 5 SYN-ACK IP addresses for July peak
Rank IP Address Packets % of Total Country Source Port
1 69.195.124.205 114 388 26.05 United States tcp/80
2 72.167.1.128 113 470 25.84 United States tcp/80
3 59.56.97.105 76 346 17.39 China tcp/80
4 144.76.237.113 66 287 15.09 Germany tcp/80
5 37.182.9.32 28 057 6.39 Italy tcp/80
The top five IP addresses account for 90.76% of the total traffic for the day, all of which
3WhoIs is a querying protocol used to query various domain registry databases who store information
related to internet resources such as DNS and IP information
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have the same source port of tcp/80. Once again, this is an indication that these backscat-
ter packets are possibly the result of some form of denial of service attack on a website.
DNS details according to WhoIS for the top five IP addresses are listed below.
• 69.195.124.205 - The reverse DNS for this IP is box1005.bluehost.com. Bluehost
is a website hosting company.
• 72.167.1.128 - The reverse DNS for this IP is p3nlhg114c1114.shr.prod.phx3
.secureserver.net. Secureserver is a domain registration and website and email
hosting company.
• 59.56.97.105 - There is no reverse DNS record for this IP address, but the IP is
assigned to a Chinese telecommunications company called Chinanet.
• 144.76.237.113 - The reverse DNS record for this IP address is static.113.237
.76.144.clients.your-server.de. The IP address is assigned to Hetzner Online
GmbH, which is a website and email hosting company.
• 37.182.9.32 - The reverse DNS record for this IP address is net-37-182-9-32
.cust.vodafonedsl.it. The IP address is assigned to Vodafone Omnitel BV, the
Italian subsidiary of the Vodafone Group.
Although we have found that all the IP addresses within the network telescope’s range
had received packet, there are some that had received substantially more traffic to that
others. Table 4.12 shows the top five destination IP addresses according to packet count
for the entire year. Only the last octet of the destination IP address is listed in the table..
Table 4.12: Top 5 destination IP addresses for backscatter traffic
Rank IP Address Packets % of Total
1 .202 597 037 4.59
2 .84 520 295 4.00
3 .154 232 437 1.78
4 .42 181 498 1.39
5 .245 180 266 1.38
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4.7 Source IP Addresses
As mentioned in Section 3.4, Wireshark used the databases provided by Maxmind Lite,
which allowed each IP address to be mapped to its source country. Because geolocation
data gets updated often due to IP addresses or blocks being assigned to different organi-
sations, geolocation information for below IP addresses may have changed from the time
this research was carried out.
Table 4.13: Top 10 source IP addresses based on packet count
Rank IP Address # Packets % Packets Data (MB) Country Ports Accessed
1 94.102.49.7 803 554 0.46 46 Netherlands 800 various TCP ports
2 77.72.82.80 758 357 0.44 43 United Kingdom 2615 various TCP ports
3 163.172.135.224 662 807 0.38 38 United Kingdom tcp/3128
4 185.94.111.1 625 962 0.36 44 Russia 15 various TCP & UDP ports
5 74.125.206.197 591 265 0.34 39 United States 20 536 various TCP ports
6 191.101.167.235 584 613 0.33 33 Netherlands 6 various TCP ports
7 178.159.37.99 565 206 0.32 32 Russia tcp/3128
8 27.155.122.30 543 297 0.31 31 China udp/5060 & udp/5080
9 163.172.215.161 508 588 0.29 220 Netherlands udp/5060
10 59.56.72.49 489 146 0.28 29 China tcp/63507,tcp/63544 & tcp/63572
Σ 6 159 795 3.51 555
Table 4.13 presents the top five IP addresses based on packet count. The differences in
both packet count and data between the top 10 are rather marginal. With 803 554 packets
and accounting for only 0.13% of total traffic, the top IP only surpasses the fifth IP by
212 289 packets. This marginal decrease can be seen throughout the list of top 20 source
IP addresses, full details of which can be seen in Appendix A.1. Below are some DNS
details related to the top five IP addresses:
• 94.102.49.7 - Quasi Networks LTD (towing.carsmemo.com)
• 77.72.82.80 - United Protection (UK) Security LTD (hostby.ups-gb.co.uk)
• 163.172.135.224 - scaleway.com
• 185.94.111.1 - Qrator Labs (qrator.net)
• 74.125.206.197 - Google LLC (wk-in-f197.1e100.net)
For the entire 2017 time period, packets from 237 countries were captured by the net-
work telescope. Table 4.14 shows the statistics for the top 10 countries based on packet
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Table 4.14: Top Countries based on packet count
Rank Country # Packets % Packets Unique IP’s Data (MB) Top 5 Ports in Order
1 China 37 123 833 21.33 2 057 423 2 228 TCP 23, 1433, 22, 2323, 3306
2 United States 23 513 819 13.51 245 084 1 768 TCP 23, 22, 80, 443, 1433
3 Russia 11 315 663 6.50 846 655 854 TCP 23, 3128, 22, 7547, 2323
4 Netherlands 8 932 781 5.13 14 078 1 015 TCP 8545, 23, 445, 22, 80
5 Brazil 7 567 119 4.35 2 108 782 453 TCP 23, 5358, 22, 2323, 6789
6 Korea 6 342 037 3.64 115 504 506 TCP 23, 5358, 22, 7547, 1433
7 India 6 301 886 3.62 960 340 377 TCP 23, 2323, 22, 21, 5358
8 United Kingdom 5 797 870 3.33 153 746 626 TCP, 3128, 23, 3389, 22, 1433
9 Vietnam 4 932 397 2.83 676 664 293 TCP 23, 5358, 2323, 7547, 22
10 France 4 787 156 2.75 61 642 882 TCP 22, 23, 80, 46307, 44418
Σ 116 614 561 67.00 7 239 918 9003
38 South Africa 490 563 0.28 41 203 36 TCP 23, 3389, 7547, 1433, 2323
count. IP addresses attributable to China were responsible for 37 123 833 packets, which
accounted for 21.33% of the total traffic for 2017.
The combined packets from the top 10 countries were responsible for 67% of all traffic
and 67.81% of the total data. They also accounted for a total of 54.55% of all distinct
IP addresses. A full global geolocation heatmap, based on packet count, can be seen in
Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Global heatmap of source IP addresses based on packet count
As was previously mentioned in Section 3.2, there was a total of 13 271 685 unique source
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IP addresses that sent packets. Figure 4.10 shows the traffic pattern for the count of
unique source IP addresses over time. The highest count of unique source IP addresses
occurred on 2nd January, with a total of 248 588. Of this total unique IP addresses,
98.50% of them were TCP packets as well as 98.03% of them being SYN packets. The
five most prominent destination ports were tcp/23, tcp/23231, tcp/6789, tcp/2323 and
tcp/22, all of which are associated with Mirai or variants of Mirai (Van der Elzen and van
Heugten, 2017). Traffic on these ports are discussed in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 5.1.
A further noticeable spike in unique source IP addresses occurred on 29 November 2017,
as annotated in Figure 4.10. A total of 648 101 packets were received on this day, coming
from 193 129 unique source IP addresses. TCP traffic accounted for 99.23% of the total
unique source IP addresses, with 599 057 packets. The top two destination ports were
found to be tcp/23 and tcp/2323, accounting for 54.56% and 7.79% of packets respectively.
The next three ports of the top five were tcp/22, tcp/1433 and tcp/445. Once again, the
high presence of tcp/23 and tcp/2323 is a good indicator of Mirai like traffic activity. The
lowest occurrence was on 27 July, with only 50 298 unique IP addresses.
Figure 4.10: Traffic pattern for the count of unique IP addresses over time
64
4.8 Destination IP Addresses
The network telescope used in this research monitored a /24 IPv4 netblock located within
the 155/8 range. All 256 IP addresses in the netblock received traffic to it, with some
being targeted more often than others. Table 4.15 lists the top 10 destination IP addresses
ranked by volume of packets received. Note that only the last octet of the destination IP
address is shown.
Table 4.15: Top 10 destination IP addresses based on packet count
Rank Last Octet # Packets TCP UDP ICMP Data (MB) Distinct IP’s
1 202 1 227 698 1 160 986 63 298 3 940 83 283 622
2 84 1 141 390 1 072 310 63 618 6 346 79 282 235
3 1 902 832 600 355 83 708 219 748 65 286 145
4 154 852 864 787 628 61 946 3 799 62 281 535
5 245 849 161 754 337 91 412 3 926 63 282 880
6 42 805 201 738 048 63 726 4 222 59 281 703
7 142 789 363 723 426 62 007 4 464 58 281 889
8 100 778 803 710 984 64 187 4 506 57 282 847
9 102 778 313 711 545 63 260 4 672 57 282 392
10 222 769 798 696 591 69 622 4 125 63 285 138
Σ 8 895 423 7 956 210 68 6784 259748 64.6 283 038
Figure 4.11 displays the traffic patterns for the top two ranked IP addresses from Table
4.15. As can be seen, the traffic to these IP addresses are fairly consistent throughout
the year, with the exception of the three large spikes, as annotated in the figure. The
first two spikes are from the top ranked destination IP address. The analysis of the first
spike showed that out of the 311 652 packets received on that day, 309 022 packets came
from a single IP address located in China. These were all SYN-ACK packets with a TCP
destination port of 29526 and a source port of 80. It can therefore be deduced that this
is likely to be the reflected traffic from some form of DDoS web attack. The smaller spike
occurring in May was further analysed as well. Again a single IP address from China
was responsible for largest portion of the traffic on that day. There was a total of 42 221
SYN-ACK packets received this IP address with a destination port of TCP/63690 and a
source port of TCP/30000.
The third spike in Figure 4.11 is from the second ranked destination IP address. As with
the top ranked IP, the traffic is quite low and consistent until the huge spike at the end of
October. Analysis of this traffic spike showed that of the total of 305 837 packets received
on that day, 301 010 of them originated from a single IP address located in China as well.
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This too was SYN-ACK traffic with a destination port of 63572 and a source port of 4220.
In the cases of the second and third spikes in traffic, the source ports for the SYN-ACK
traffic are most likely the destination ports for the initial SYN packets to the targeted
servers in China. These are uncommon ports with no official services allocated to them,
hence it was possibly a very targeted attack or an open port on a system that was being
compromised.
Figure 4.11: Traffic pattern for the count of unique IP addresses over time
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4.9 Summary
This chapter applied the analysis methods described in Chapter 3 and presented the
analysis results of this research project. The research performed an in-depth analysis of
darknet traffic captured by a passive network sensor located within a South African IPv4
netblock.
The overall theme of the chapter was to discuss and present the statistics and metrics of
the results and was divided into five separate sections. Section 4.1 introduced the chapter
and some of the high level results. It started by discussing the three most common IP
level protocols, namely TCP, UDP and ICMP. It presented the detailed analyses of lower
level protocols and the individual contributions made by TCP, UDP and ICMP packets.
Monthly details for traffic analysis were shown and the top contributing destination ports
for both TCP and UDP were discussed. The ICMP traffic was further classified according
to the type, i.e. Echo Requests, Echo Reply, Time Exceeded, etc. For all traffic types, the
top contributing source IP addresses were discussed and details illustrated. Sections 4.2,
4.3 and 4.4 performed a detailed analysis of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic respectively.
Section 4.2.1 focused on the TCP flag that had been set on each packet. The TCP flag
provided an indication into what traffic was purely scanning and what was deflected or
backscatter traffic. Section 4.5 continued by looking at the packets and associated data
received for each month of 2017. Interesting anomalies in the graphs were highlighted
and discussed in this section. As TCP comprised an overwhelming majority of the traffic,
a further analysis and classification of the traffic was carried out. Section 4.6 used the
discussions from Section 4.2.1 as a base to build on and discuss the backscatter traffic.
The final two sections, Section 4.7 and Section 4.8, looked and the source and destination
IP addresses respectively. Geolocation information provided by Maxmind Lite databases
within Wireshark matched each source IP address to the country that it was assigned
to. This allowed classification of traffic according to country, with the top contributing
countries based on packet count illustrated. The destination IP addresses were ranked
according to the ones most targeted and the details of this traffic was illustrated.
Interesting and specific findings that were uncovered in this chapter will be handled as
individual case studies in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Case Studies
Chapter 5 discusses a few notable case studies that were found in the results. Section 5.1
looks at possible malware activity within the traffic patterns and flows with regards to
the behaviour of certain source IP addresses and ports targeted. Continuing on from the
initial discussions of TCP flags in Section 4.2.1, Section 5.2 investigates the network and
port scanning activities detected. The final case study, Section 5.3, discusses the high
occurrence of SIP traffic in the data set. Lastly, the chapter is summarised by concluding
the findings and discussions in Section 5.4.
5.1 Malware Activity
Finding traces of malware in such a large dataset is quite challenging, especially when
it is only one way traffic. As previously mentioned in Section 2.3.1, TCP goes through
a 3 way handshake to establish a connection and to eventually send data, hence, the
handshake is never created and we therefor do not see the payload. One is however able
to match certain traffic patterns to the way specific malware operates, thereby allowing
one to deduce the presence of the malware based on the observations. One such example
is that of the Mirai malware.
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Mirai essentially operated as a DDoS attack on embedded IoT devices running Linux on
ARM CPU architecture. Many broadband routers and IoT webcams were affected by this
(Kolias et al., 2017). The malware firstly scanned what appeared to be pseudo-random
internet IP addresses on ports 23 and 2323. Once a vulnerable device had been discovered,
a brute force password attack was launched in order to gain access to the shell via a telnet
connection. Mirai had a preconfigured list of default usernames and passwords that it
would use to perform the brute force attack with. When a device became compromised,
the malware was executed on it, essentially turning it into a bot which continued to scan
the internet for new targets (Antonakakis et al., 2017).
The first cases of Mirai were detected in the beginning of August 2016, with a prolific
rise in attacks following over the next three months. The source code for Mirai was
publicly released by the group responsible for it, which led to many further Mirai variants
spreading over the internet well into 2017 (Kolias et al., 2017).
Figure 5.1: Traffic patterns over time for TCP/23 and TCP/2323
Looking at the list of top TCP ports (Table 4.2), we saw that the highest occurrence
was that of tcp/23, with tcp/2323 following soon after at fourth highest. Figure 5.1
shows the traffic patterns for tcp/23 and tcp/2323, with specific points highlighted as
“A”, “B”, “C” and “D”. Point “A” represents a peak in tcp/23 traffic towards the end
of January, with a coinciding peak in tcp/2323 traffic marked as point “C”. A similar
trend can be seen towards the end of November / beginning of December, marked as “B”
and “D” respectively. Table 5.1 shows the top ten IP addresses for traffic having made
made connections on both tcp/23 and tcp/2323. All IP addresses listed only sent SYN
packets, meaning the connections were all initiated from these IP addresses and were not
backscatter or reply packets.
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Table 5.1: Top 5 IP addresses based on packet count (TCP/23 and TCP/2323)
Rank IP Address TCP/23 TCP/2323 Country Owner according to WhoIs
1 185.188.207.26 203 520 22 411 Germany Proact Deutschland GmbH
2 185.188.207.28 159 002 17 865 Germany Proact Deutschland GmbH
3 202.98.59.37 104 925 11 726 China Chinanet CQ
4 101.251.213.198 70 254 7 589 China Beijing Capitalonline Data Service
5 111.62.44.99 60 571 6 939 China China Mobile Communications Corporation
A further analysis of these IP addresses were conducted, including a deeper inspection
of the individual tcp/2323 packets. All packets from the top two ranked IP addresses
in Table 5.1 were extracted from the data set. Passive OS fingerprinting, as outlined
in Section 3.3.5, was used to fingerprint them. All packets returned as “unknown”. As
tcp/23 traffic formed a much larger volume of the overall traffic and was also a more
commonly used port, there was a greater chance that the traffic could contain a higher
percentage of non-Mirai traffic as well. The tcp/2323 traffic was then instead taken, as
it was a smaller volume of traffic and because the port is not commonly used for services
on the internet. This traffic was analysed using both p0f and NetworkMiner, who both
returned very similar results. Table 5.2 shows the results from p0f for all tcp/2323 traffic.
Table 5.2: Results of p0f analysis of TCP/2323 traffic
# Packets % Packets
All tcp/2323 packets 4 427 821 100
Unknown 3 749 034 84.66
Linux Kernel 677 863 15.30
Windows 923 0.02
Apple Macintosh 1 <0.01
The largest volume of tcp/2323 traffic could not be positively identified and returned
as “unknown”. This unkown packets accounted for 84.66% of the total tcp/2323 traffic.
Packets identified as Linux Kernel accounted for 15.30%, with Windows packets only
accounting for 0.02% of the total traffic.
It was not possible to conclusively confirm that this traffic was responsible by a Mirai
variant and quite difficult to attribute it 100%, although it is quite probable due to
connectivity only on tcp/23 and tcp/2323 and the fact that the operating system could
either not be matched, or the ones that did match were largely from a Linux based OS.
The traffic patterns in the dataset also fits in with the timeline of the Mirai variants.
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One of the biggest cyber security incidents of 2017 was the WannaCry1 Ransomware
attack. This malware took advantage of a security vulnerability in the Microsoft SMB
protocol (Mohurle and Patil, 2017). This was a self-propagating worm which would infect
a machine and then spread across the network infecting other machines. Infected machines
would have their data encrypted and message demanding a ransom would be displayed
on the screen (Chen and Bridges, 2017).
The WannaCry traffic would spread by scanning the network on tcp/445, looking for a
machine with the SMB vulnerability. The first recorded infection of WannaCry was on 12
May 2017 (Jones, 2017). Figure 5.2 shows the traffic patterns for tcp/445 and the traffic
patterns for number of unique IP addresses over time. The graph shows fairly constant
activity of between January and April, with a continuous sharp rise in traffic from May
onwards. There is also a sharp rise in unique source IP addresses from May 2017 until
the end of the year.
Figure 5.2: Traffic patterns for TCP/445 and unique source IP’s over time
More than 99% of the tcp/445 traffic was found to only be SYN packets. Because TCP
requires a 3 way handshake to establish the connection, as previously described in Sec-
tion 2.3.1, only the TCP SYN packet header fields were recorded. Without the payload
information, this traffic cannot actually be confirmed as WannaCry scanning. However,
the sharp increase in tcp/445 traffic from May 2017 onwards, coincides with the timeline
of the WannaCry attack (Jones, 2017).
Table 5.3 displays the top 10 countries, based on packet count, where tcp/445 connections
originated from. According to Ghosh (2017), systems in approximately 150 countries were
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry ransomware attack
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Table 5.3: Top 10 countries for TCP/445 traffic based on packet count
Rank Country # Packets % Packets
1 United States 377 372 17.41
2 China 224 446 10.36
3 Hong Kong 206 599 9.53
4 Netherlands 180 785 8.34
5 Russia 115 579 5.33
6 India 113 437 5.23
7 Indonesia 105 940 4.89
8 Vietnam 78 200 3.61
9 Seychelles 69 856 3.22
10 France 40 133 1.85
Σ 1 512 347 69.78
affected by WannaCry, with Russia and India being two of the worst affected. All the
countries listed in Table 5.3 were also listed by Ghosh (2017) as countries affected by
WannaCry.
5.2 Network and Port Scanning
The differences between network and port scanning has previously been discussed in
section 2.7.1. It is essentially a series of continuous connections to IP addresses on various
ports with the intention of checking which services are active. It can be seen as a type of
reconnaissance, usually done over short periods of time.
The top five source IP addresses for all traffic, as briefly discussed previously in 4.7, were
further analysed to get a fuller understanding of it. Figure 5.3 displays the traffic patterns
for the top five IP addresses over time. Table 5.4 displays some extended statistics about
the top five.
Looking at the traffic patterns in Figure 5.3 and statistics from Table 5.4, they can be
divided into roughly two groups. IP addresses 94.102.49.7, 77.72.82.80 and 74.125.206.197
connected to multiple destination ports which spanned the entire destination IP range of
the network telescope. IP addresses 163.172.135.224 and 185.94.111.1 also connected
to the full range of destination IP addresses of the network telescope as well, but only
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Figure 5.3: Traffic patterns of top 5 source IP’s over time
connected on a handful of destination ports.
Table 5.4: Extended statistics of top 5 source IP addresses
Rank IP Address # Unique TCP Ports # Unique UDP Ports # Distinct Dest IP’s Sum Dest IP’s
1 94.102.49.7 800 None 256 591 265
2 77.72.82.80 2 615 None 256 758 357
3 163.172.135.224 1 None 256 803 554
4 185.94.111.1 6 9 256 662 807
5 74.125.206.197 20 536 None 256 625 962
The first group of IP addresses performed a very typical type of port scan in that a large
array of ports were checked for activity. These scans were much more aggressive and done
for a short period of time. In analysing the destination ports being targeted by this group
of IP addresses, the following interesting details were picked up.
• IP 94.102.49.7 only appeared to scan the lower and middle end ports, with certain
exceptions found in the higher range, i.e. scanned ports were mainly in the range
of ports 1 - 3388 and 6500 - 45000
• IP 77.72.82.80 only appeared to scan ports within the middle range with certain
exceptions found in the lower and higher ranges, i.e. scanned ports were mainly in
the range of ports 3388 - 6500
• IP address 74.125.206.197 only scanned ports in the high end, i.e. scanned ports
were mainly in the range of ports 45000 - 65535
• Very seldom did any of these IP addresses scan the same ports
• No UDP ports were scanned by these IP addresses
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In the second group, a total of 1 288 768 scans were performed across a total of 16
destination ports. When referring to Figure 5.3, we notice that there was a very low
intensity scan done by IP address 163.172.135.224 from January up until August. The
only port scanned was TCP 3128, which is generally a port used by a web proxy server
such as squid. Initially this could be mistaken for a misconfigured server or device due to
the length of the scans and the limitation of the single destination port. However, when
looking at the actual packets in Wireshark, the packets arrive in bunches of the same
source ports trying to connect to random destination IP addresses. A few seconds later
the same is repeated, but with different source ports and different random destination
IP addresses. This is typical of an automated scan trying to find an open web proxy
server. With IP address 185.94.111.1 we see that the there is also a very low intensity
scan performed for nearly the entire 2017 period. Figure 5.4 shows the packet distribution
of IP 185.94.111.1 for all the destination ports over time.
Figure 5.4: Traffic patterns of top 5 source IP’s over time
The UDP ports were scanned continuously throughout the entire year, with intermittent
breaks across all destination ports for short time periods only. The TCP ports on the
other hand were each scanned for only specific time periods. The list of TCP and UDP
ports can be seen in Figure 5.4.
74
5.3 Session Initiation Protocol
As introduced in Section 2.5, SIP traffic operates independently of the underlying protocol
and can be encapsulated in either TCP or UDP. All the SIP traffic recorded in this data
was found to be encapsulated in UDP. The total SIP traffic only accounted for 2.63%
of the total packets received in 2017, but it was responsible for a massive 71.14% of the
total data for 2017. Because the SIP traffic was encapsulated in UDP, it allowed the
packet sizes to be much larger. All TCP packets which were received were no larger
that 60 bytes, whereas the average UDP encapsulated SIP packet was about 450 bytes.
Raftopoulos et al. (2015) states that the packet sizes for their UDP encapsulated sipscan
traffic ranged between 382 and 451 bytes. The vast majority of SIP traffic was found to
be directed towards udp/5060, which received 70.81% of all SIP traffic. However, there
were many other ports which were targeted as well. In total, 722 different UDP ports
received SIP traffic.
Figure 5.5 shows a screenshot of a portion of a single SIP packet displayed in Wire-
shark. This screenshot was taken of the actual research data. The header fields that were
described in Section 2.5 can be seen in the figure.
Figure 5.5: Screenshot of SIP header, as seen in Wireshark
Figure 5.6 illustrates the traffic patterns for all SIP traffic in 2017. There is a fairly
average and steady traffic flow throughout the year, with only a slight increase from
January through to December, as indicated by the trend line.
Apart from the slight increase in overall traffic through the year, there are distinct spikes
in traffic observable on particular days. These spikes occurred throughout the year. The
top five traffic spikes through the year, which are highlighted in Figure 5.6, were further
analysed and are listed below in order of greatest to smallest.
• 14 April 2017 - The largest spike of traffic occurred on this day, with a total of 102
674 SIP packets that were received, accounting for 1.58% of the total traffic for 2017.
This traffic was responsible for 45MB of data. There were 39 unique IP addresses
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Figure 5.6: SIP traffic pattern for 2017
responsible for the SIP traffic on this day. Of these IP addresses, the top three were
responsible for 84.27% of the total traffic for the day. The top three IP addresses in
order from top to bottom are 213.202.254.134 (49 151 packets), 5.189.136.244 (27
133 packets) and 155.94.65.2 (10 240 packets).
• 2 September 2017 - The second largest traffic spike occurred on this date, with a
total of 71 638 SIP packets received from 57 unique IP addresses. Of the source IP
addresses, the top two accounted for 82.54% of the total traffic for this day. These
two IP addresses, in order of top to bottom, are 51.15.143.144 (29 952 packets) and
92.4.108.203 (29 103 packets). The first source IP address originated from France
and the second IP address originated from Switzerland.
• 9 May 2017 - There were a total of 61 828 SIP packets received coming from
53 unique IP addresses on this day. These unique IP addresses originated from
only eight countries, with the United States taking the lead with a total of 27 IP
addresses. The top IP address (155.94.88.18) according to packet count, originated
in the United States and was responsible for 54.24% (33 536 packets) of the SIP
traffic for that day.
• 17 January 2017 - There was a total of 53 015 packets received on this day, coming
from 32 unique IP addresses. The top IP address (104.193.11.107) originated from
the United States and accounted for 33 280 packets, which is 62.77% of the total
SIP traffic for that day.
• 16 August 2017 - There was a total of 52 196 SIP packets received from 67 unique
IP addresses on this day. The top IP address according to packet count, originated
from Switzerland and was the only IP address from this country on this day. This
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IP address, which is 92.42.108.203, accounted for a total of 27 091 packets, which is
51.90% of the total SIP traffic for the day.
As very briefly touched on previously, the SIP traffic had much larger packet sizes than
the other packets. For the full period of 2017, there were a total of 6 471 918 SIP packets
received, accounting for approximately 9 GB of data. When compared to the total packets
and data received for the full 2017 period, the SIP traffic accounted for only 3.71% of the
total packets, yet it accounted for 21.06% of the total data. Table 5.5 displays the top 10
IP addresses based on SIP packet count. Figure 5.7 further shows the traffic patterns for
the top five of these IP addresses.
Table 5.5: Top 10 IP addresses for SIP traffic
Rank IP Address Packets % Packets Data (MB) Country
1 163.172.215.161 508 588 7.85 220 Netherlands
2 92.42.107.139 190 005 2.93 81 Switzerland
3 146.0.243.29 142 336 2.19 61 Germany
4 62.210.36.129 120 057 1.85 52 France
5 92.42.108.203 102 097 1.57 44 Switzerland
6 51.15.209.185 88 320 1.36 38 France
7 155.94.89.42 67 071 1.03 29 United States
8 51.15.12.233 63 221 0.97 27 Netherlands
9 51.15.87.3 60 928 0.94 26 France
10 155.94.65.2 50 176 0.77 22 United States
All the top five source IP addresses had multiple connections to every destination IP
address in the network telescope range. This is very typical network scanning that is tak-
ing place. Looking at the traffic patterns of the top five IP addresses, we see that there
are two distinct scanning methods occurring. The first method sees a very low number
of connections over a very long period of time. The second method sees a much more
erratic scan, with higher number of connections over a shorter period of time. When
viewing the packets in Wireshark, further details such as the SIP Message Header can be
seen, which gives more insight into the source of the traffic. An example of this message
header can be seen in Figure 5.5. Over 99% of the SIP traffic had an indication that the
traffic was generated by a program called “SIPVicious”2. SIPVicious is an open source
collection of software tools used to scan SIP enabled Voice over IP systems. It is often
used in penetration testing. This indication can be seen in the “From:” field in the mes-
2http://sipvicious.org
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sage header where it states the sender’s name as “sipvicious”, as can be seen in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.7: Top 5 source IP addresses traffic patterns
A macro analysis of the geolocation of source IP addresses for SIP traffic was conducted.
SIP packets were received from IP addresses coming from 60 distinct source countries.
Table 5.6 shows the statistical data for SIP traffic, based on the geolocation information
of the source IP addresses for the top 10 countries. As can be seen, the majority of SIP
traffic originated from IP addresses in France. It accounted for nearly a quarter of all SIP
packets as well as nearly a quarter of all SIP data in 2017. The table also shows that
the top five countries combined, accounted for roughly 84.8% of all SIP traffic and data
in 2017. Furthermore, despite receiving packets from 60 different countries, IP addresses
coming from the top ten countries were responsible for 97% of all SIP traffic and data in
2017.
Table 5.6: Top 10 countries for SIP traffic based on packet count
Rank Country # Packets % Packets Data (MB) % Data # Unique IP’s
1 France 1 581 059 24.42 683 24.42 496
2 Netherlands 1 263 771 19.52 544 19.45 263
3 Germany 1 083 011 16.73 471 16.84 418
4 United States 819 029 12.65 352 12.58 735
5 United Kingdom 743 323 11.48 322 11.51 184
6 Switzerland 351 002 5.42 151 5.40 17
7 Russian Federation 188 820 2.91 81 2.89 117
8 Canada 156 888 2.42 69 2.46 91
9 Lithuania 74 751 1.15 33 1.18 37
10 India 24 021 0.37 10 0.35 23
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In the research conducted by Raftopoulos et al. (2015), they analysed telescope data from
three different sources. The SIP scanning traffic was categorised according to country
based on packet count. In their top 10 countries, six of the top 10 countries in this research
list also appeared in theirs. The countries are India, Russian Federation, Switzerland,
Germany, United States and Canada. Figure 5.8 shows a stacked bar graph of the top
five country’s packets for each month of 2017.
Figure 5.8: SIP traffic by top 5 countries per month
5.4 Summary
Chapter 5 dealt with notable case studies found in the results. This section built on the
results in the previous section, but did a more granular analysis of it. The chapter was
divided into four specific sections, each dealing with a specific case study.
Section 5.1 started off the chapter by discussing the presence of malware activity discov-
ered in the data, specifically instances of Mirai like traffic were identified. Section 5.2
performed a detailed investigation of the network and port scanning traffic. The top five
source IP addresses were looked at and traffic patterns illustrated. The monthly high
and low occurrences were highlighted as well as the top contributing source IP addresses.
Lastly, Section 5.3 analysed the source of the SIP traffic, with specific reference to source
IP address and geolocation of source traffic.
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CHAPTER 6
Comparison with Previous Work
This chapter will compare the results of this study against the results of previous research
done in this field of study, specifically research done at Rhodes University on all the
different data sets collected in the past 12 years.. A detailed analysis of this specific data
set and the manner in which it was analysed had never been done before, which is one
of the reasons why it was chosen. There have in the past however been various other
studies done on the broader data sets collected by Rhodes University, albeit with regards
to different aspects of the data. The comparison will focus on the following studies and
their results, as listed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Previous research used in the comparison
Research Subject Authors and Year
Towards a Taxonomy of Network Scanning Techniques Barnett and Irwin (2008)
A Framework for the Application of Network Telescope Sensors in a Global IP Network Irwin (2011)
A Network Telescope Perspective of the Conficker Outbreak Irwin (2012)
A Baseline Study of Potentially Malicious Activity across Five Network Telescopes Irwin (2013)
A System for Characterising Internet Background Radiation Yates (2014)
Observed Correlations of Unsolicited Network Traffic over Five Distinct IPv4 Netblocks Irwin and Nkhumeleni (2015a)
Effectiveness of Sampling a Small Sized Network Telescope in IBR Data Collection Chindipha et al. (2018)
The previous research, as listed in Table 6.1, dealt with many different aspects of IBR
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and would not necessarily have analysed the data as was done in this research project.
The comparison will therefore be limited to the following aspects:
• IBR traffic volumes
• Traffic composition
• Targeted destination ports
• Geographic location of source IP address
6.1 IBR Traffic Volumes
As previously mentioned in Section 3.3.1, the data used by Irwin (2011) was collected over
a five year period and across five /24 IPv4 telescopes. This was the first detailed analysis
done on the data collected by the Rhodes telescopes. The total volume of traffic for the
duration was approximately 23 million packets. Over a very similar time period, Irwin
(2012) recorded 16 million packets over a four year period from a single /24 sensor. Yates
(2014) notes that the volume of packets reaching the five sensors differ quite substantially.
The ‘older’ 196/8 sensors received almost double the amount of packets to the newer 146/8
and 155/8 sensors. The 155/8 sensor, which is the same one used in this study, received
approximately 9 million packets over a six month period. The data for Chindipha et al.
(2018) was collected on the 155/8 sensor in February 2018. A total of 27.5 million packets
were collected over that single month. The data for this research project consisted of
approximately 174 million packets collected from a single /24 sensor over a 12 month
period. The earliest network telescope was commissioned in 2005, which means that it
has been operating for approximately 14 years. In that time, IBR has increased from
under 1 million packets per month to currently almost 28 million packets per month. The
arrival rates of the packets have increased tremendously too. Irwin (2011) recorded the
packet rate to be at around 18 packets per minute in 2009. The average packet rate in
the data set in this study (2017) had grown to around 300 packets per minute.
6.2 Traffic Composition
A comparison of IBR composition at the IP layer is a good indicator of how internet
traffic patterns have changed over the years. In this section the three most common lower
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level protocols will be compared, i.e. TCP, UDP and ICMP. Results for this study was
previously mentioned in Section 4.2 and found the composition as follows: TCP accounted
for the largest portion of overall traffic, accounting for 89.70% of the total traffic. UDP
traffic accounted for 9.52% and ICMP accounted for 0.77%. Table 6.2 shows the protocol
comparison as found in the previous studies. All statistics are for the 155/8 telescope
except for the Irwin (2011). It is being included as it was the earliest work done on the
Rhodes telescopes’ data over the period 2007 - 2010.
Table 6.2: Comparison of IP protocols
Author and Year Data Period % TCP % UDP % ICMP
This Research (2017) 2017 89.70 9.52 0.77
Irwin (2011) 2005 - 2009 81.57 12.62 5.89
Irwin (2013) 2011 - 2012 77.18 14.45 8.36
Yates (2014) 2013 - 2014 57.84 37.21 4.94
Nkhumeleni (2014) 2011 - 2012 76.34 14.79 8.86
Table 6.2 shows that TCP has always been the most dominant protocol, with UDP and
ICMP in at 2nd and 3rd respectively. The decrease in TCP and increase in UDP reported
by Yates (2014) has been attributed to the presence of SQL Slammer worm during that
time period. The worm operated on udp/1434, hence the increase in overall UDP traffic.
2017 saw a significant decrease in overall ICMP traffic when compared to previous years’
findings. The full year’s protocol analysis is shown in Table 4.1. The highest percentage
of ICMP traffic was recorded in August 2017, with only 1.02% in total for the month.
This may be an indication that ICMP echo is no longer preferred for simple network host
detection scan, but rather applications such as ZMap1 which is able to scan using TCP
SYN packets at quite high rates.
6.3 Targeted Destination Ports
The top TCP and UDP destination ports offer a good insight into what applications are
most targeted on the internet. During certain periods of worm or virus activity, spikes in
particular destination ports are noticed immediately. Tables 4.2 and 4.5 have previously
shown the top TCP and UDP identified in this research respectively. Tables 6.3 and 6.4
compares the top TCP and UDP destination ports with previous research. The second
column in each of these tables contains the port statistics from this research.
1An open source network scanner - https://zmap.io/
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Table 6.3: Comparison of top 10 TCP destination ports
Rank This Research Irwin (2011) Irwin (2013) Yates (2014) Nkhumeleni (2014)
1 23 445 3389 22 3389
2 22 135 1433 3389 1433
3 1433 139 445 80 80
4 2323 22 80 23 445
5 5358 1433 57471 8080 57471
6 7547 2967 22 1433 22
7 3389 5900 8080 445 8080
8 445 23 23 443 23
9 80 80 3072 5900 1234
10 3128 50272 135 1234 1024
For the top 10 TCP ports identified in this research, seven of them appear in the top 10
lists of previous work. The ones who appear in previous research are TCP ports 23, 22,
1433, 3389, 445, 80 and 3128. These are all very common ports and it is understandable
that they would appear in a top 10 list. The ports who do not appear in previous research
are 2323, 5358 and 7547. As previously mentioned in Section 5.1, tcp/2323 was identified
as being associated with variants of the Mirai malware. The timeline for the tcp/2323
traffic fits in well with that of the activity of the Mirai variants. As Mirai also scanned on
tcp/23, a distinct correlation in traffic patterns have also been observed between tcp/23
and tcp/2323, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The remaining two ports that do not appear
in previous results are tcp/5358 and tcp/7547. de Bruijne et al. (2017) state that there
has been an increase in activity on these ports over the past few years due to the fact
that these ports are associated with various IoT devices. They are used the for remote
connectivity or management of devices. IoT has only started appearing over the last few
years, which would explain why these ports were never seen in top 10 lists before now.
The most targeted TCP ports, which appear in the top 10 lists of all the comparative
research, are 22, 23, 80, 445 and 1433.
For the UDP traffic listed in Table 6.4, only a single port has consistently appeared in
the top 10 list of this research and all previous research. This port is udp/1434, which
is used by Microsoft SQL Server. Another interesting port, which appears in the top
two of all research after Irwin (2011), is udp/5060. As previously discussed in Sections
4.3 and 5.3, this port is commonly used by SIP traffic. SIP scanning has become quite
prevalent on the internet and occupies a large portion of IBR traffic. DNS typically runs
on udp/53 and is also found in the top 10 of all research other than Irwin (2011). DNS
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Table 6.4: Comparison of top 10 UDP destination ports
Rank This Research Irwin (2011) Irwin (2013) Yates (2014) Nkhumeleni (2014)
1 5060 1434 5060 53 5060
2 1900 137 1434 5060 1434
3 123 1026 137 19 6257
4 53 1027 6257 3544 137
5 53413 38293 32737 1434 53
6 161 19932 53 6588 6568
7 137 135 6568 161 60505
8 19 1028 60505 12 43815
9 111 1029 43815 39455 32737
10 1434 5158 39455 19222 39455
cache poisoning has been an attack vector for many years and continues to be targeted
still. This method gets a DNS server to store incorrect or malicious DNS details about
a webpage or host. Subsequently when valid requests are sent to the DNS server for this
particular webpage or host, the the malicious details are returned to the victim, who then
inadvertently accesses the malicious link (Trostle et al., 2010).
6.4 Geolocation of Source IP Address
The only research to fully report the geolocation findings of source IP address analysis is
Irwin (2011). Table 6.5 displays the comparison of top 10 countries based on geolocation of
the source IP addresses. The statistics on the left side are from the results of this research
and those on the right are from Irwin (2011). Looking at the list of top 10 countries, five
of the countries from this research can also be found in the previous research. These
countries are China, United States, Russia, Brazil and Korea. South Africa is ranked at
3rd, but if it were to be removed from the list, then the top three ranked countries would
be the same in both sets of results.
It’s interesting to note that the percentage volume of traffic for China, United States and
Russia remain very similar between the two sets of results, despite there being approxi-
mately a 10 year gap between when the packets were recorded. Currently, South Africa
does not even appear in the top 10 list and in actual fact, is ranked as 38th in the results
of this research. It only accounts for 0.28% of the traffic compared to 9.51% previously.
Egypt, which is ranked 10th in the previous research, has also dropped quite a bit now
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Table 6.5: Comparison of top 10 countries based on geolocation of the source IP addresses
This Research Irwin (2011)
Rank Country % Packets Country % Packets
1 China 21.33 China 19.73
2 United States 13.51 United States 10.94
3 Russia 6.50 South Africa 9.51
4 Netherlands 5.13 Russia 5.55
5 Brazil 4.35 Taiwan 3.65
6 Korea 3.64 Brazil 3.53
7 India 3.62 Germany 3.11
8 United Kingdom 3.33 Korea 2.66
9 Vietnam 2.83 Italy 2.58
10 France 2.75 Egypt 2.42
Σ 66.99 63.68
and is listed in 32nd place currently. Previously it contributed to 2.42% of the traffic, but
currently it only represents 0.44% of the total traffic. When summing up the contributions
of the top 10 countries, it is interesting to see that the volumes for both sets of data are
very close, with an approximate difference of about 3%.
6.5 Independent Research Outside of Rhodes
Much of the seminal work in IBR research can be attributed to Moore et al. (2004); Pang
et al. (2004); Barford et al. (2006); Wustrow et al. (2010), where many of the terms used
today were coined. This work laid the foundation for the future research done using
network telescopes.
Moore et al. (2004) discussed what the actual network telescope was and how it could
be used as a resource to study internet events. Pang et al. (2004) did an analysis of IBR
traffic and produced many results similar to this research. Their results were used as
a comparison throughout the results of this research. Pang et al. (2004) looked at the
sources of the traffic, the protocols and ports used and pointed out the differences between
scanning traffic and reflected backscatter traffic. They provided a characterisation of the
traffic and was able to demonstrate the significance of the background radiation. Barford
et al. (2006) built on this work by identifying and classifying malicious source IP addresses.
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The aim of the research was to understand the distribution of these source IP addresses
to see where the traffic originates.
The subsequent work done in this area has assisted in identifying and studying many of
the global internet events including the SQL Slammer worm (Moore et al., 2003), Code
Red worm (Moore et al., 2002) and Conficker (Hick et al., 2009; Irwin, 2012).
6.6 Summary
The comparisons discussed in this chapter were the most basic statistics from the results
being compared. The findings of this research was compared to previous, with specific
focus on the work done at Rhodes. It did however briefly look at and compare the results
to other work in the larger research fields. The discussions covered in this chapter are a
good indicator of how IBR has evolved through the years.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
This chapter summarises the thesis and concludes the discussion on the findings of this
research. The chapter starts with Section 7.1 providing a summary of each chapter of
this thesis. Section 7.2 addresses the initial project goals and objectives and evaluates
the findings. Section 7.3 then looks forward to possible future research in this field of
study. Lastly, Section 7.4 provides the final remarks on the thesis and the significance of
research in this field.
7.1 Research Project Overview
This thesis paper consists of seven chapters, with this concluding chapter being the sev-
enth. Each chapter contains multiple sections, each discussing and presenting a different
aspect of the subject matter as it relates to the objectives of the project.
Chapter 1 started by introducing the subject matter of this research project. The problem
statement and research objectives and goals were clearly defined in this chapter. Building
on from that, the scope of the research was outlined and the methodology used was further
explained.
Chapter 2 conducted a review of previous literature and research dealing with IBR and
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network telescopes. The chapter started by introducing the subject and discussed a
classification scheme used for network telescopes, based on the netblock being monitored
and the active hosts found within the netblock. The size of the network telescope was
investigated to determine the impact it had on observing random packets on the internet.
Because network telescope traffic is only TCP/IP, the analysis of the most dominant lower
level protocols (TCP, UDP and ICMP) were looked at in great detail. Along with the
lower level protocols, the application level ones were also discussed as part of the traffic
analysis and classification. Key research focus areas of previous work were investigated,
which created a platform for the work that was done in this study. IBR has been able to
provide valuable insight for the research of global network events. The main events being
internet worm and malware activity, network and port scanning activities and distributed
denial of service attacks. This chapter looked at some of the seminal work done at CAIDA.
Chapter 3 was divided into two sections. The first section presented the the data set and
expanded on the source of it, how it was collected and provided a brief overview of the
initial analysis. This included the basic statistics regarding the packet count, the number
of unique source IP addresses, data count and the rate of data flow. The second section
took a look at the raw data files and discussed the tools that were used to extract the
relevant data, the storage of the outputted data, the analyse it and eventually the visual
presentation of the findings. This section also discussed any other tools that were used in
the analysis of the data.
Chapter 4 presented the findings of the analysis. A large portion of this chapter was
dedicated to the statistics and metrics which were derived from a very detailed analysis of
the data. This included a comparison of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. Within these lower
level protocols, the application level protocols were also categorised and traffic patterns
compared. The top TCP and UDP destination ports were listed, along with the common
usage of the ports and the security risks associated with them. The largest portion of
traffic was TCP, which was then subsequently further categorised according the the flag
that had been set on each packet. The categorisation based on TCP flag allowed for the
traffic to be identified as either pure scanning traffic, or reflected traffic from internet
events such as DDoS attacks or malware activity.
Chapter 5 looked at the findings of the previous chapter and highlighted four specific case
studies to be further investigated and analysed. The first case study looked at possible
Mirai like malware activity discovered in the data set. The second case study specifically
looked at the network and port scanning traffic from the top source IP addresses based
on packet count. This traffic was identified by the SYN TCP flag that had been set. The
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third case study performed a deeper analysis of the backscatter traffic and attempted to
identify the sources of the packets. The final case study examined the high occurrence of
SIP scanning traffic.
Chapter 6 looks at some of the key results of this research and compares it to the find-
ings of previous ones. The commonalities and differences in findings are highlighted and
illustrated in this chapter.
7.2 Project Goals and Objectives Revisited
This research project stated in Section 1.2 the goals and objectives set out. There are
two primary objectives and four supporting or secondary objectives. In order to evaluate
the effectiveness of this research project, the goals and objectives are revisited to see if
they have been achieved.
7.2.1 Primary Objective 1
The first primary objective was to compare the results of the IBR analysis from this
research with the results of previous work, specifically with regards to research done in
collaboration with Rhodes University. This objective was fully met, as was demonstrated
in Chapter 6. Besides the comparison presented in Chapter 6, within Chapters 4 and 5
certain findings were compared with research done in the greater global research commu-
nities.
7.2.2 Primary Objective 2
The second primary objective was to see if any significant anomalies could be detected
in the traffic that pertained to any global malware attacks. Chapter 5 discussed different
case studies, one of which dealt with the presence of Mirai like scanning traffic which had
been detected. This objective was therefor fully met as well.
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7.2.3 Secondary Objectives
The secondary objectives, albeit seemingly secondary in nature, played an integral role
in providing the evidence for and supporting the primary objectives. The secondary ob-
jectives required a granular level analysis of the data in order to support and provide
evidences for the primary objectives. The secondary objectives also required that ob-
servations, trends and conclusions be derived from the analysis of the traffic. Chapter
4 provided a detailed analysis of the traffic which included statistics and metrics of the
results. These objectives were therefor fully met as well.
7.3 Future Work
This research focused on the analysis of IBR from a single /24 IPv4 network telescope.
As mentioned before, Rhodes University operates this telescope along with four other
/24 IPv4 telescopes. The netblocks being monitored by all these five telescopes are non-
contiguous to each other. As stated by Nkhumeleni (2014), the logical distances between
the netblocks being monitored are quite substantial. All traffic reaching these telescopes
are currently being captured and are being archived. A detailed analysis of the captured
traffic, as was performed in this research, has not been carried out on the data from
the other telescopes in the past few years. It would be interesting to analyse the traffic
from the remaining four telescopes in order to determine if the same traffic patterns are
observable across them. Moore et al. (2004) states that the probability of observing
random packets on the internet is greater with larger netblocks. Much of the previous
research done at other institutions used large /8 darknets, which even if it was split into
smaller netblocks, would be contiguous to each other. Analysing the traffic from five
random non-contiguous netblocks should surely provide some valuable insight.
The study of darknets and IBR has been ongoing for almost two decades, with much
progress made in the identification and analysis of the traffic. Nearly all this work has
been done on IPv4 networks. This is understandable as IPv6 has not yet been adopted
and very limited ranges are currently routed on parts of the internet. It was previously
mentioned that when IPv6 does eventually get implemented globally, there will be a large
increase in internet traffic as it will be implemented alongside IPv4 at that time. As
stated by Irwin (2011), no IPv6 packets were detected in the data set from that study,
which ran over a five year period. The data from that research was however collected 10
years ago. Implementing an IPv6 telescope to detect the implementation of IPv6 over the
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years would provide valuable insight as it changes and the movement from IPv4 to IPv6.
7.4 Final Remarks
The work done on IBR identification and detection has had a significant impact on global
internet pollution research. This has led to strategies and mechanisms to limit the impact
that it has. It is unfortunately a “game” where the poles keep shifting, which means that
continuous research is required to stay ahead of new methods. This research has also
played a crucial role in the post analysis of various malware activity. Certain malware
attacks were able to be studied from the start of the infection till it eventually died down.
This research now needs to be used to implement an autonomous IBR and malware
detection system that can be used to lower the impact that it has on the internet.
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APPENDIX A
Overview of libpcap raw files
In this appendix, details about the libpcap raw data files are provided. The screenshots
were taken of the outputs of running the following command in Linux:
capinfos -A <filename>
The raw files were labelled as follows:
January - jan2017.cap
February - feb2017.cap
March - mar2017.cap
April - apr2017.cap
May - may2017.cap
June - june2017.cap
July - july2017.cap
August - aug2017.cap
September - sep2017.cap
October - oct2017.cap
November - nov2017
December - dec2017.cap
100
A.1
Figure A.1: Capinfos output for jan2017.cap
Figure A.2: Capinfos output for feb2017.cap
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Figure A.3: Capinfos output for mar2017.cap
Figure A.4: Capinfos output for apr2017.cap
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Figure A.5: Capinfos output for may2017.cap
Figure A.6: Capinfos output for june2017.cap
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Figure A.7: Capinfos output for july2017.cap
Figure A.8: Capinfos output for aug2017.cap
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Figure A.9: Capinfos output for sep2017.cap
Figure A.10: Capinfos output for oct2017.cap
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Figure A.11: Capinfos output for nov2017.cap
Figure A.12: Capinfos output for dec2017.cap
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APPENDIX B
Creation of CSV files from libpcap
In this appendix, some details about the csv file creation is provided. The relevant fields
and information were extracted from the libpcap and exported to CSV format. The
commands used to extract the data is as follows:
For all packets:
tshark -r libcap file -T fields -e frame.time epoch -e ws.col.Protocol -e tcp.flags -e ip.src -e
ip.dst -e ip.geoip.src country -e tcp.srcport -e tcp.dstport -E header=y -E separator=/t/
-E quote=d -E occurrence=f > csv output
For only ICMP packets:
tshark -r libcap file -Y icmp -T fields -e frame.time epoch -e ws.col.Protocol -e icmp.type
-e icmp.code -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e ip.geoip.src country -E header=y -E separator=/t/ -E
quote=d -E occurrence=f > csv output
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APPENDIX C
Overview of database tables
This appendix gives a brief overview of the database tables that were created for this
research project. It provides screenshots of the table creation scripts as well as screenshots
of the table sctructure and the field types.
C.1
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Figure C.1: SQL create script for libpcap table
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Figure C.2: SQL create script for icmp table
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Figure C.3: Table and column structure for libpcap table
Figure C.4: Table and column structure for icmp table
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